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The Need for a Revitalized Common
Law of the Workplace*
William R. Corbett'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1960 only two major federal statutory laws regulated
employment in the United States. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935.' The NLRA was
followed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.2 For the next
twenty-five years, no federal labor statutes were enacted. Then,
for a thirty-year period beginning in 1963, Congress enacted a
host of employment laws: the Equal Pay Act,3 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),' the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA),' the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),' the
© 2003 William R. Corbett. All Rights Reserved.
t Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center
of
Louisiana State University. Earlier drafts of this article were presented to faculty at
the University of Georgia School of Law, to students in Professor Rebecca Hanner
White's Law of the Workplace seminar at the University of Georgia School of Law, and
to the Federalist Society at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center. I appreciate the valuable
input I received from faculty and students at each of those presentations. I also thank
Michael Selmi, Rebecca Hanner White, and David West for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
' Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (2000)).
2 Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (2000)).
3 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
206(d) (2000)).
' Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a to 2000e-15 (2000)).
5 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 621-33a (2000)).
6 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (2000)).
7 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 29 (1974) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§
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Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),9 the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), 0 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)," the Civil
Rights Act of 1991"2 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA).' The first three years of .the 1990s, with the
enactment of three major laws, is a particularly notable period
for the proliferation of employment legislation." However, the
FMLA, the last generally applicable federal employment law, is
now ten years old. Since 1993, legislation has been proposed
but stalled in Congress."0
From the dearth of federal employment legislation since
1993, one might conclude that no significant employment
issues have arisen or that another means has been found for
1001-1461(2000)).
8 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§2000e(k) (2000)).
9 Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-09 (2000)).
10 Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-09 (2000)).
" Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
12 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981a
and other scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
13 Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54
(2000)).

One way of gauging the ascendancy of an area of the law is to consider law
school curricula. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Disintegrationof Labor Law: Some Notes
for a Comparative Study of Legal Transformation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311 (1998).
Until employment discrimination appeared in the 1970s in law school curricula, labor
law in both scholarship and curricula meant collective bargaining and the National
Labor Relations Act. Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the
Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988).
Even after employment discrimination became established in law schools, it would be
the early- to mid-1990s before employment law became a course offering. Douglas L.
Leslie, Retelling the InternationalPaper Story, 102 YALE L.J. 1897, 1906 n.32 (1993)
(noting that law schools were starting to offer "employment law" courses, and
predicting that they would push "labor law" into the specialty category); Steven
Howard Kropp, Rethinking the Labor and Employment Law Curriculum: Legal
Education's Belated Response to the Demise of Collective Bargainingand the Rise of
Individual Rights, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 433 (1991) (book review) (reviewing individual
employment rights casebooks).
'5 Consider, for example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which
would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The bill was reintroduced in the House and
Senate on July 31, 2001. That bill was first introduced in 1994. ENDA Will be ReIntroduced in Congress on July 31, DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 30, 2001 (No. 145), at
A8. Electronic monitoring bills have been introduced since the early 1990s, but none
have been enacted. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. Genetic
discrimination bills have been introduced in recent congressional sessions, but they
have not been enacted. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
1
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addressing such issues. Yet, the need to protect employees from
abuses in the workplace has not significantly dissipated, and in
some respects may have increased. Disrespect, incivility,
humiliation of workers,'6 and the invasion of their privacy 7 are
not rare in American workplaces. Indeed, science and
technology have posed at least three significant new threats to
the dignity and autonomy of workers. First, workers today fear
the Orwellian nightmare that "Big Brother"'8 employer will
invade their privacy by using technology to record their
conversations, monitor their e-mail communications, and track
their Internet use. 9 Second, it is possible that employers may
obtain genetic information about their employees and use it to
decide whom to hire, fire, promote, or subject to other
employment actions. ° Although generally treated as an
'6 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 73 (2001); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying'
and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475
(2000); The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute Website (formerly the Campaign
Against Workplace Bullying), at http://www.bullyinginstitute.org (last visited Feb. 13,
2003); Marilyn Elias, Study: Rudeness is Poisoning U.S. Workplace; Disrespect Causes
Anxious Employees, Lower Productivity, USA TODAY, June 14, 2001, at Dl; Pat Karlak,
Rude, Rude, Rude: Workplace Incivility Is on the Rise and Companies Are Taking
Notice, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 2001, at 1; Effects of Workplace Incivility
Widespread, Likely to Linger, Research Study Concludes, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), June
19, 2001 (No. 117), at A4.
17 Regarding the various types of
invasion of privacy, see generally MATTHEW
W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (1995 & Cumulative. Supp. 1997 & Supp.
2001). In the seminal article on the right of privacy, Warren and Brandeis wrote that
in cases of intrusion into privacy, the violation is a "blow to human dignity, an assault
on human personality." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 197-198 (1890); see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public
Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1996).
18 GEORGE ORWELL,
1984 (1949).
19 See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, 2001 Survey: Workplace Monitoring &
Surveillance: Policies and Practices (Aug. 7, 2001), results reprinted in Employers
Watching Computer Use for Legal Liability, AMA Survey Finds, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Aug. 9, 2001 (No. 153), at A5 (reporting that, of 435 employers surveyed, more
than 60% monitor employees' Internet connections, and about 47% store and review
employees' e-mail messages); Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking? A First
Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289
(2002); Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Management: E-Mail Monitoring in
the Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW. 311 (2001); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/PrivateDistinction:Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825
(1998); Charles E. Frayer, Note, Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing
Workers' Rights and Dignity With Legitimate Management Interests, 57 BUS. LAW. 857
(2002); Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and
Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001); Nathan Watson, Note, The Private
Workplace and the Proposed"Notice of Electronic MonitoringAct": Is "Notice' Enough?,
54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79 (2001).
20 See,
e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic
Privacy:
Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U.L. REV. 1497
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employment discrimination issue, employers' obtaining and
using employees' genetic information is more effectively
conceptualized and addressed as an invasion of privacy issue."
A third major issue regarding mistreatment of employees in
the workplace stems, in part, from the fast-paced, around-theclock, pressure-packed work environment of the global market.
Workers are complaining of bullying and harassment by their
supervisors and co-workers." For many, the abuse they suffer
in the workplace may affect both their health and quality of
life, as well as their employer's productivity and ability to
provide a safe workplace.
Facing problems of electronic monitoring, genetic
discrimination, and harassment (not limited to abuse based on
protected status), as well as increasing public attention to
these issues, Congress might respond, as it has to past
workplace problems, with federal legislation. Both members of
Congress and many employee rights advocates are promoting
federal legislation to address these problems. So far, all such
proposals have failed at the federal level and only genetic
discrimination laws have passed at the state level. Still,
employee rights advocates and scholars in the United States
favor individual employment rights legislation, particularly at
the federal level, to address workplace issues.' And why not?
Title VII and the anti-discrimination principles and theories
(2002); Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort, 34 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 965 (2001); Glendora Hughes, Genetically Incorrect, 35 MD. B.J. 34 (JanlFeb.
2002); Paul Steven Miller, Is There A Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discriminationin
the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL. 225 (2000); David J. Wukitsch, New York's
Legal Restrictions on the Employer's Collection and Use of an Employee's Genetic
Information, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39 (1998); Jared A. Feldman & Richard J. Katz,
Note, Genetic Testing & Discrimination in Employment: Recommending a Uniform
Statutory Approach, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2002). In the initial lawsuit of
its kind, the EEOC sued Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. for genetic testing
of employees, alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On May 6,
2002, the case settled for $2.2 million. See EEOC's First Genetic Testing Challenge
Settled for $2.2 Million, Parties Announce, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), May 9, 2002 (No.
90), at Al [hereinafter EEOC's FirstGenetic Testing Challenge].
21 See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text; see also Kim, supra note 20.
22 See sources cited supra
note 16.
23 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the
Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 698
(1993) (noting the current preference for legislative regulation); Rosa Ehrenreich,
Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace
Harassment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1, 32 n.128 (1999) ("In part, the preference for Title VII
[rather than torts to address harassment claims] may reflect a scholarly bias in favor of
federal law."); cf. J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A
Modest Proposal to De-MarginalizeEmployment Law, 81 IOwA L. REV. 347, 370 (1995)
(labeling wrongful discharge legislation "the deus ex machina of employment law").
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that emanate from it are the greatest triumph of employment
law in the United States.2

The failure to enact federal legislative responses to
emerging workplace issues does not necessarily signal the
demise of employment law in the United States. What it may
signal is the end of an era, spanning about thirty years, when
federal legislation was the legal method of choice to address
emerging workplace problems. We have reached a point in the
development of American employment law at which the
regulatory panacea for the latter half of the twentieth century
has become very difficult to implement. That situation is likely
to be exacerbated in the years ahead. The era of federal
employment legislation as the predominant type of
employment law may be over - at least for a while."
Regardless of whether an epoch in employment law
history has passed, at this point in time individual employment
rights legislation is not an appropriate response to these
emerging workplace problems." This is so for three reasons
that apply, to varying degrees, to each of the three issues electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and general
harassment. The first is "fit." It is difficult to draft legislation
that effectively addresses these problems - in other words, that
fits the problems. They require analytical flexibility that
cannot be readily built into a statute. Such flexibility is
necessary both because of the variety of factual situations, and
the lack of consensus on the societal balancing of the conflicting
interests of employers and employees. On the issue of
electronic monitoring in particular, employers' interests are
numerous and credible; consequently, it is not clear how and
24 See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in
the United States: The
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 85 (2000) (identifying the

employment anti-discrimination laws as "[tihe one form of relatively effective legal
protection of workers"); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace,
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 61 (2000) (calling equal protection and antidiscrimination law "[olne of the epic legal developments of the twentieth century"); cf.
Kim, supra note 20, at 1524 (discussing the early successes of Title VII in battling
employment discrimination in the decade after its passage, but questioning its current
efficacy). ea
I am not predicting that no
more federal employment legislation
will be
enacted in the foreseeable future, and I certainly am not urging that result. For some
workplace issues, such as discrimination against homosexuals, amending Title VII is
an obvious response and a natural extension of the extant employment discrimination
laws. I am arguing, however, that over-dependence on federal legislation must end.
26 It may never be, but as I will discuss below, it is
premature to reach that
conclusion.
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under what circumstances U.S. society should prohibit
electronic monitoring by employers. Nor is it clear for what
types of harassing or bullying conduct, and by what persons,
society should hold employers liable. Further development of
the law is needed on a case-by-case basis. At some point,
sufficient consensus in the case law may develop, allowing
federal or state legislatures to incorporate the standards into a
statute. However, it is also possible that some or all of these
issues require the flexibility of common law analysis, as the
cases may be so fact-driven that statutes will never be an
effective method for addressing them. Thus, fit may never be
achieved for one or more of these employment issues.
Second, the timing is wrong for legislative responses to
these problems. Legislation and common law are often
interdependent and dynamic: As one develops to address an
issue inadequately met by the other, it sometimes provokes
change in the other. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s,
common law tort theories proved no answer to the pervasive
problem of sexual harassment. Consequently, the theory of
sexual harassment was developed under Title VII.27 Thereafter,
the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress became a reliable alternative theory of recovery for
victims of sexual harassment." Thus, 1ihe federal legislation
prompted an evolution in the common law. Conversely, the
common law theories of wrongful discharge and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing led to the passage of the
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act' and other
state statutory responses to wrongful discharge." Because of
the fit problems discussed above, it is time for common law to
take the lead and provide responses to the emerging workplace
problems of electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination and
bullying. Legislation may follow later.
Third, despite the success of past employment
legislation, resorting to this method of regulation too often can
generate significant backlash. Statutory employment laws have
problems and weaknesses," and no shortage of opponents who
27 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis
in Assessing
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610-11 (1992).
28 See Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts

in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1709-10 (1996).
'9 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 914 (2002).
30 See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 20, at 1525-32.
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trumpet those problems. Moreover, legislation provides a far
more concrete target for opponents than evolving common law.
The attack can be launched against the specific legislation or
the general proliferation of statutes regulating the workplace.
Although it may sound unusual to employee rights advocates in
the hire-and-fire legal regime of the United States," there are
many who criticize the considerable expansion of employment
legislation in the last forty years." Regardless of one's view
about the need for more employment protections in the United
States, it is undeniable that there was a rapid proliferation of
statutory employment law from 1963 to 1993.' Overlap and
conflict among employment laws creates problems 5 and lends
credibility to the view that we have experienced employment
law sprawl in this nation. For example, some argue that
genetic discrimination laws duplicate protection provided by
the Americans with Disabilities Act.5 In short, employment law
has enough enemies. Its friends need to make careful and
deliberate choices about the methods of regulation for the
future so that they do not play into the hands of its opponents.
Now is not the appropriate time and these are not the
appropriate issues for enacting new employment legislation.
Emerging workplace issues afford the opportunity to
correct an over-dependence on legislation to regulate
32 Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering
at Century's
End: Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C.L. REV. 103, 103-04

(1999) ("As is generally well known, the United States historically has provided
comparatively meager formal legal protections of the employment relationship. Foreign
observers typically characterize us as a 'hire and fire' society....").
33 Chief among the critics are libertarian and law-and-economics
scholars
such as Richard Epstein. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. Epstein, In
Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); see also WALTER OLSON,
THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1997).
Kohler, supra note 32, at 104 ("Despite our renown for relatively
abstemious public intervention in workplace relationships and our general preference
for private ordering, the previous ten to fifteen years has been a period of unusual
legislative and judicial activity.").
35 Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns:
A Changing of the

Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 18-19 (1988) (predicting that reconciling overlapping
protections would be the most difficult problem in employment law and stating that
"[olne can scarcely imagine an arrangement better designed to hold out promises to the
employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the legal
machinery.").
Sen. Kennedy to Address Genetic Bias Bill's Overlap of ADA, Privacy
Regulations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap in Genetic
Bias Legislation Is Examined in House Hearing on Bill, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July
12, 2001 (No. 133), at A8.
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employment. The stated concerns demonstrate not just that
legislation would be a poor response now, but also suggest what
is needed: a revitalized common law of the workplace. It is odd
that the common law applicable to one of the most significant
aspects of most people's lives37 has fallen into relative
desuetude and is no longer viewed as a viable approach to
addressing workplace problems.
In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, state courts
explored innovations in tort and contract law to address
dissatisfactions with perceived abusive discharges under the
employment-at-will doctrine.38 Unlike those common law
responses, courts today will not need to create new common
law theories; the tort theories of invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress can be tweaked to do
the job. Notably, however, as with the common law
developments of the earlier period, courts will have to overcome
their concerns that adjusting the tort theories to accommodate
the workplace will impinge too much on employers' power and
prerogative.
It is true that common law development is slow and
incremental compared with the passage of legislation.39
Furthermore, it does not have the panache or newsworthiness
of legislation. But the common law does have some advantages.
Its flexibility can accommodate a variety of situations that are
difficult to address through legislation. It permits standards to
evolve as society, in a panorama of cases, considers the

37 Americans work more hours than any other people in the world and define

themselves largely by their work. U.S. Workers Put in Longer Hours But Were
Outpaced in Production,Says Study, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 31, 2001 (No. 169),
at A6 (quoting the economist who led the survey for the International Labour
Organization: "American workers have a tendency to define ourselves by what we do
for a living. American workers keep working longer and longer and longer hours.");
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-91 (2000); Katherine V.W.
Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace For
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (discussing how work has
eclipsed other primary factors in defining social identity); Kohler, supra note 32, at 108
("[O]ne's life takes on publicly intelligible meaning largely through participation in
market labor. The job not only constitutes one's chief claim to wealth, but is also the
prime determinant of one's status."); Wilborn, supra note 19, at 835 (noting that people
often define themselves by occupations); cf. Estlund, supra note 24, at 3 ("[Tlhe
workplace is the single most important site of cooperative interaction and sociability
among adult citizens outside the family.").
See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
'9 Cf Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1539, 1547 & 1565 (1997) ("The measured, respectful movement of a new tort will
always appear feeble to activists .... ").
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problems presented and works them out individually. Finally,
common law development does not provide a hard target for
opponents of employment law. By the time the target solidifies,
opponents may be willing to support employment statutes,
which then may be viewed as preferable to the common law.
Part II of this Article discusses the emerging workplace
issues of electronic invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination,
and bullying. It considers both the inadequacies of existing law
and proposals for change. Part III discusses the current collage
that is the employment law of the United States. It traces the
law's development and considers how various methods of
regulation have been used at various times. Part IV expresses
some specific reservations about using legislation to address
these emerging workplace problems. Finally, Part V discusses
changes that courts must make in tort theories so that they can
adequately address these particular issues.
II. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INVADERS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATORS,
AND BULLIES: THE QUEST FOR LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Invasions of privacy, genetic discrimination, and general
harassment are all manifestations of disrespect and incivility
in the workplace. Many believe that rampant disrespect in the
workplace inflicts deleterious consequences on both employees
and employers .40 Workplace
abuse
causes employees
considerable distress. 4' Likewise, electronic monitoring of
employees seriously affects both their mental and physical
health.42 Additionally, humiliation imposes substantial costs on
employers in terms of lost work time, decreased productivity,

40

41

See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 19, at 320; Yamada, supra note 16, at 483-84.
See, e.g., Attitudes in the Workplace VII: The Seventh Annual Labor Day

Survey (Harris Interactive 2001) (reporting that more than 35% of workers surveyed
said that their jobs are harming their physical or mental health, and 42% said job
pressures were interfering with their personal relationships); Survey Shows Growing
Job Malaise Despite Boom Times in U.S. Labor Market, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Oct.
17, 2000 (No. 201), at A7. But see Review of Survey Data Finds Little Change in Job
SatisfactionLevels Over HalfCentury, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 28, 2001 (No. 166),
at A5 (reporting findings of American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
based on survey that most Americans are satisfied with their jobs, and the level of
satisfaction has remained relatively constant for more than fifty years).
Legal commentators and others have written on the harm that workplace humiliation
causes employees. See sources cited supra note 16.
42 Wilborn, supra note 19, at 838 nn.47-48 (citing studies).
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poor morale and loss of employees." Even the "epidemic" of
workplace violence" relates to workplace incivility."
Privacy invaders and bullies are the current hobgoblins
in the employment world. That is not to say that
discriminators, the workplace demons of the last century, have
been exorcized. However, a significant segment of society
believes that forty years of powerful legal intervention has
abated virulent workplace discrimination against African
Americans, women, and others. Now, some attention has
shifted to status-neutral (color-blind, sex-blind, etc.) initiatives
to make the workplace more civil for all workers, a place where
the relatively powerful do not bully, invade the privacy of, and
otherwise inflict dignitary harms on the relatively powerless.4
Concurrently, attention has shifted away from regulating
abusive discharges to regulating the terms and conditions
during employment.
A.

Privacy Invasion: ElectronicInvaders and Genetic
Discriminators
1. Definitions and Examples

Invasion of privacy may be the dominant employment
issue of our time.48 Although often discussed, privacy is a hard
concept to define." It has been described as "a value asserted by
individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive
society."' Privacy has to do with an individual's autonomy and
43 See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 16, at 483-84.
41 ILO Cites Worldwide Epidemic, Urges Global Response to Violence at Work,

DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 20, 1998, at A5.
45 See Yamada, supra note 16, at 483. A legislative panel in Massachusetts
studying workplace violence, the Massachusetts Joint Committee on Public Safety,
recommended that employers adopt "zero tolerance policies" on workplace violence,
threats, harassment, and bullying. See Massachusetts Panel Seeks Zero Tolerance,
Humane Polices to Reduce Violence at Work, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 25, 2001 (No.
142), at A3. There are two relationships between workplace violence and workplace
incivility: first, workplace violence may be the most severe form of incivility; and
second, workplace violence may be perpetrated by victims of workplace harassment
and bullying.
46 See infra Part II.B.3.
47 See infra Part III.C.
48 See, e.g., Kesan, supra note
19, at 292.
49 Wilborn, supra note 19, at 832; Kesan, supra note 19, at 306; Kim,
supra
note 17, at 683-87; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 979-80.
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989).
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interest in guarding a realm of intimacy around her inner
1 There may be no more succinct and
person or her identity."
pragmatically useful definitions than "the right to one's
person" 2 and the "right to be let alone."" Both electronic
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination' threaten
employees' autonomy regarding personal information.
Notwithstanding definitional problems, most Americans
would agree that privacy is a fundamental and cherished
right." Still, Americans recognize, at least in some contexts,
that their privacy rights are not absolute. Those rights must be
balanced against competing societal interests, and in some
cases the balance will be struck in favor of invasions of varying
types and degrees. This recognition was no more evident than
in the aftermath of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, when
Americans quickly acknowledged, although regretfully, that to
some extent privacy rights must yield to security interests.
Similarly, the common law tort of invasion of privacy
recognizes both that privacy must be balanced with other
important policies,57 and that privacy is alienable.' Professor
Robert Post has eloquently described the delicacy of the
American right to privacy: "That fragility [of privacy norms in
modern life] stems not merely from our ravenous appetite for
the management of our social environment, but from the
undeniable prerogatives of public accountability.""
Employers invade workplace privacy in many ways and
use different devices, including paper-and-pencil examinations,
video cameras, tape recorders, medical examinations and tests,
and computers. Employers have diverse interests in so doing.
An employer may seek to prevent the following: computer
" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 197; Kim, supra note 20, at 1501;
Post, supra note 50, at 958; Wilborn, supra note 19, at 832-33.
52 Makdisi, supra note 20, at 980-81 (quoting
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF

CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 207.
Makdisi, supra note 20, at 980-81 (citing COOLEY, supra note 52, at 29).
Kim, supra note 20, at 1501, 1535.
Wilborn, supra note 19, at 831.
See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 912 (2002) ("[Tjhe shocking September 11 terrorist
attacks threaten to skew the already tenuous balance between privacy and security in
favor of the latter."); Layoffs and Privacy, 18 INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. (BNA) 4 (2001)
(discussing how concerns of national security are eroding privacy).
57 Kesan, supra note 19, at 303.
58 Id. at 306.
59 Post, supra note 50, at 1010.
"5
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crime; dissemination of trade secrets and confidential
information to competitors; use of work time for personal
activities and pursuits; and risky employee conduct that may
result in imposition of liability on the employer for sexual
harassment, defamation, or computer crime. Employers also
have an interest in hiring and promoting employees who are
physically and mentally fit for particular jobs.'
The privacy right of employees is hard to articulate in
the abstract. It is the right to be left alone, but almost everyone
would admit that the right, never absolute to begin with,
certainly is further circumscribed by the workplace and the
employer's interests. Still, employee rights advocates insist
that employees have a right of privacy that restricts an
employer from knowing too much about them, controlling them
too closely or emotionally hurting them."' The following two
subparts more particularly describe two types of invasion of
privacy, electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination,
respectively.
a. Electronic Monitoring
The most high-profile workplace privacy issue of the day
is electronic monitoring of employee communications and
activities. It is one of the most prevalent monitoring or
surveillance techniques, permitting a level of "observation" not
possible through other means" and causing considerable
60 Regarding electronic monitoring, see Kesan, supra note 19, at 310-15
(discussing employers' reasons for conducting electronic monitoring of employees);
Watson, supra note 19, at 101 (same); Richman, supra note 19 (discussing employers'
need to monitor to attempt to avoid liability for sexual harassment, negligent hiring,
and negligent retention in cases of workplace violence). For discussion of potential
employer liability for the computer crimes of employees, see generally Mark Ishman,
Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior Doctrine:Employers Beware,
6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6 (2000).
Regarding genetic testing, see Kim, supra note 20, at 1539-42; Feldman & Katz, supra
note 20, at 396-97 (discussing reasons for employers to conduct genetic testing of
employees and to take employment actions based on test results).
61 Professor Kim cites the following as core areas of privacy: one's body and
bodily functions; personal information relating to health and sexual matters; one's
home; and traditionally private communications. See Kim, supra note 17, at 700-01.
62 Kesan, supra note 19, at 305; see also Frayer, supra note 19, at 858-59
(discussing Silentwatch by Adai, Inc., a software package that permits monitoring that
is surprising in both its breadth and depth). Clearswift's MIMEsweeper software line
includes MIMEsweeper, which audits individual Web traffic and warns offenders who
access inappropriate sites or view/receive inappropriate e-mail content. See
http://www.mimesweeper.com/products/msw/msw web/default.asp (last visited Aug. 9,
2003). SpectorSoft touts its Spector Pro software package with, "When you Absolutely

2003]

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

103

distress among employees.' Furthermore, electronic monitoring
is an area where technology has outstripped the law, leaving
employees largely unprotected.' Some types of electronic
monitoring garnering the most attention are simultaneous
monitoring of computers, such as keystroke monitoring,
retrieval of e-mail messages and stored computer files, and
mapping of Internet sites visited by employees. The 2001
survey by the American Management Association showed that
at least two-thirds of major U.S. firms engage in electronic
monitoring. That number has doubled in the last five years.'
Ironically, when employees claim their employer has
injured their dignity by electronic monitoring, employers
sometimes respond that they are promoting civility and
protecting the dignity of other employees. Thus, one person's
invasive, disrespectful act is another's attempt to enforce
respect. For example, in May 2000, Dow Chemical performed
an e-mail audit at its Freeport, Texas plant and found that 254
out of 5,500 employees had saved, filed, or sent sexual or
otherwise inappropriate e-mail.' Dow fired twenty employees,
arguing that it was attempting to prevent sexual harassment
and had developed policies to promote respect and
responsibility. 7
There are of course many other illustrative stories and
lawsuits regarding electronic monitoring in the workplace.
Consider the case of the insurance company executive fired just
three days before his shares of stock, worth millions, were to
vest. His employer said it fired him because he repeatedly
accessed pornographic sites on the Internet while he was at
work.' The executive contended that he did not intentionally
need to know Everything they are doing online." http://www.spectrosoft.com (last
visited Aug. 13, 2002). Including eBlaster 3.0 (for e-mail) and Spector (for computer
screen snapshots), the package offers "snapshot recording, Email recording,
Chat/Instant Message logs and sophisticated Keystroke journals." Id.
67 wilborn, supra note 19, at 838.
Kesan, supra note 19, at 304-05; Patrick Boyd, Note, Tipping the Balance
of Power: Employer Intrusion on Employee Privacy Through Technological Innovation,
14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 181, 182 (1999) ("Technological innovation.., now
permits employers to compromise their employees by violating their right to privacy in
a way not anticipated by earlier laws.").
65 Am. Mmgt. Ass'n, 2001 Survey: Workplace
Monitoring & Surveillance:
Policies and Practices,supra note 19.
Panel Orders Dow Chemical to Reinstate a Dozen Workers Firedfor E-Mail
Abuse, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr. 16, 2002 (No. 73), at A2.
67 Id.
An arbitration panel ordered reinstatement of twelve of the discharged
employees because of disparate enforcement of the policy by Dow.
TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (Cal. Ct. App.
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access the sites, but they simply "popped up" on his computer.
He sued the employer for wrongful termination, arguing that
the employer's stated reason was pretextual."
The employer had provided him two computers, one to
keep at work and one to keep at home. During discovery, the
employer demanded production of the home computer with no
deletions or alterations of any information stored on the hard
drive. The plaintiff resisted, contending in part that he had a
state constitutional right of privacy in the information stored
on the computer's hard drive. Unfortunately for the plaintiff,
he had signed the company's "electronic and telephone
equipment policy statement."" The court held that he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in light of his voluntary
waiver." The court also discussed that under the "community
norms" of "21 t Century computer-dependent businesses," major
review
employee
monitor,
record,
and
employers
communications and activities."2 The case demonstrates that
even when employers monitor to protect a legitimate interest,
the results of the monitoring can be used as a pretext for an
illegitimate or bad reason for an adverse employment action.73
b. Genetic Discrimination
A second privacy issue is genetic testing74 of employees,
and adverse employment actions based on the information
obtained from those tests.75 Like electronic monitoring, genetic
discrimination" has become possible in the workplace because
2002).
Id. at 158.
70 Under the policy, he agreed

not to use the systems for personal or
noncompany purposes unless expressly approved, and not to use them for "improper,
derogatory, defamatory, obscene or other inappropriate purposes." Id. at 157.
71 Id. at 164.
72 Id. at 161-62.
73 Kesan, supra note 19, at 320 ("Abuse may also take the form of voyeurism,
union-busting, ferreting out whistleblowers, and creating pretenses to fire members of
protected employee groups.").
7' "Genetic testing" and "genetic information" do not have uniformly accepted
meanings in the language of the genetic sciences. Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at
410 nn.188-89. Most enacted and proposed statutes and policies include definitions.
Commentators have distinguished between genetic screening, a one-time test to
determine whether one has a genetic predisposition or disease, and genetic monitoring,
involving periodic tests to increase workplace safety and protect the health of
employees. Id. at 395-96.
75 See generally Feldman & Katz, supra note
20.
76 Professor Kim argues that a privacy rights model offers a better
framework
for addressing genetic discrimination than the anti-discrimination model. Kim, supra

2003]

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

105

of advances in science and technology. It also has been the
subject of proposed legislation at the federal and state levels."
It has not been as pervasive as electronic monitoring because it
is not as cheap and easily available as computer monitoring,
and its reliability is still suspect." However, the financial
incentives to make genetic testing more broadly available
suggest that this type of privacy invasion will increase. 9
As a general matter, employers' use of tests to invade
the privacy of employees is not new.' In 1988, Congress all but
banned the use of polygraphs by employers in the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act." Likewise, drug tests are often
challenged under federal82 and state constitutions, state drug
testing laws, and common law tort theories."' Through statutes
and common law, some states have restricted the use of paperand-pencil tests and other types of honesty and psychological
profile tests.' However, genetic testing is a uniquely powerful
issue that poses special challenges because of the depth of the
invasion, which reaches into the secrets of one's biological
makeup, and because of the breadth of information that genetic
testing can provide.
The Human Genome Project began in 1990, and within
ten years the once unthinkable had been accomplished - the
"genetic map" was essentially complete." Now it is possible to
use a piece of hair, a drop of blood or other sliver of genetic
material to obtain extensive genetic information about a
person.' Many good results are likely to flow from this
scientific marvel, as scientists may be able to identify potential
diseases and conditions,87 and someday perhaps even work with
note 20, at 1502.

77 See infra Part

78
79

II.A.3.b.
Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 389 & n.3; Kim, supra note 20, at 1511.
Makdisi, supra note 20, at 972; Miller, supra note 20, at 235-37.

w Wukitsch, supra note 20, at 42-43.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000). Although the Act provides for
circumstances under which employers can polygraph employees, the requirements are
so stringent as to make the provisions virtually useless.
82 See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989).
See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Ala.
1989).
81

See generally David C. Yamada, The Regulation of Pre-Employment
Honesty Testing: Striking a Temporary (?) Balance Between Self-Regulation and

Prohibition,39 WAYNE L. REV. 1549 (1993).
M Kim, supra note 20, at 1497; Makdisi,
supra note 20, at 965-66.
86 Makdisi, supra note 20, at
965-66.
87 See, e.g., Miller, supra note
20, at 226.
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those genes to treat or prevent a disease. However, some bad
results may also follow. Employers can and have used new
technology to obtain genetic information about employees.'
There are many reasons why employers may want to perform
tests and obtain genetic information.' Some are completely
benign, such as complying with the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, and identifying employees whose health or safety
may be endangered, or who may endanger the health or safety
of others by working in particular jobs or environments.' Yet
other reasons strike at the heart of employees' fears: making
hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and other employment
decisions based on the information."
Specifically, employers would be inclined to take
adverse employment actions, such as refusing to hire, firing, or
denying health care coverage to individuals who tested positive
for certain genes that predisposed one to disease. Incentives
abound for employers to cull and use genetic information, such
as lowering the costs of health care, workers' compensation
costs, lost time under the Family and Medical Leave Act,
accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act, and
training expenses and other investments in employees with
little longevity.' The incentives are not merely theoretical there is evidence that such employment discrimination has in
fact occurred. Quite apart from the invasion of privacy and its
impact on adverse employment decisions, but equally
disconcerting, genetic discrimination also has a side effect that
undercuts employee health. Survey evidence indicates that
employees fear such employment discrimination and would
refuse testing based on those fears, thus foregoing the potential
benefits of preventing or decreasing the chance of developing
diseases.'

"8 See Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 393 (explaining that the following
three conditions can be determined from genetic testing: (i) person has genetic defect
that has caused or will cause a disease; (ii) person is a carrier of disease or genetic
defect; and (iii) person has predisposition to developing a disease).
89 See, e.g., Kim, supra
note 20, at 1539-42.
90 See Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 396-97; Kim, supra note 20, at
1539-42.
91 See Feldman & Katz, supra note 20,
at 397.
Id. at 397-98 (citing some of these reasons).
93 Miller, supra note 20, at 237 (citing survey of genetic services
providers
and primary health care physicians who reported knowing 582 people who were denied
employment or insurance coverage because of their genetic predispositions).
Kim, supra note 20, at 1542-43; Miller, supra note 20, at 233; Wukitsch,
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In the most notorious reported incident of alleged
genetic testing of employees, a group of thirty-six railway
workers employed by Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging that their employer had
genetically tested them without their consent or knowledge."
The employees claimed to have reported to their employer that
they suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. In turn, the
employer required them to submit to a medical examination by
non-company health care providers. Instead of being limited to
an examination for carpal tunnel syndrome, the examination
included a blood test for genetic markers. Consequently, the
EEOC filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act."
The EEOC and the employer ultimately settled the case, with
the employer denying that it had engaged in illegal testing and
agreeing to pay 2.2 million dollars. Prior to settling, the
7
company agreed to stop genetic testing.
2. Protecting Privacy: Inadequacy of Current Law
One may view the law protecting employee privacy as
consisting of "bits and pieces of legislation and of a melange of
common law categories - rife with silences, doctrinal gaps, and
inconsistencies . . . in other words, a mess."" That assessment
stems from the comparative lack of governing principles, such
as those found in German law.' The following two subparts
survey and critique the capacity of extant law to effectively
meet the challenges posed by electronic monitoring and genetic
testing.

supra note 20, at 40; Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 395 & n.56; Hughes, supra
note 20, at 36-37.
9" EEOC's First Genetic Testing Challenge, supra note 20; Molly McDonough,
EEOC Reaches $2.2 Million Settlement with Railroad,21 ABA J. E-REP. 1 (2002).

EEOC v. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 02-C-0456 (N.D. Iowa).
Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC
with Disabilities Act (May 8,
and BNSF Settle Genetic Testing Case Under Americans
2
2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-8-0 .html; see also McDonough, supra
note 95.
98 FINKIN, supra note 17, at xxi.
Id. at xx & n.10 (citing sources). The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany states that the "secrecy of post and telecommunication are inviolable." THE
97

BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY art. 10(1) (Axel Tschentscher trans., 2003). For a brief summary of German
law on workplace privacy, see Kesan, supra note 19, at 309-10.
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a. Electronic Monitoring
Currently, both federal and state laws regulate
electronic monitoring of employees. As an important initial
division, public employees enjoy protection beyond their private
counterparts
because public
employees have privacy
protections in both the federal and state constitutions."0 In only
a single state - California - does the state constitutional right
of privacy extend to private sector employees.'' Additionally,
statutory protection is provided
by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),'2° which amended
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,"3 also know as the Federal Wiretap Act.
At the state level, many state statutes more or less
track the ECPA. However, at the time the ECPA was enacted,
Internet and e-mail monitoring were not major issues.
Generally, Title I of the Act °" prohibits the interception of wire,
oral, and electronic communications, while Title II0 prohibits
accessing stored communications. As promising as those brief
descriptions sound for employees, for many reasons the ECPA
has proven largely ineffective in addressing the current issues
in computer and electronic monitoring. 6 Because the state
statutes are modeled on the federal law, most share the federal

100Wilborn, supra note 19, at 866-73; Kesan, supra note
19, at 294-95; Kim,
supra note 17, at 703-06.
101 Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865
P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994); see also
Kesan, supra note 19, at 294 (stating that "California is the only state granting
constitutional privacy rights to private sector workers").
102 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
103Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C., §§ 2510-2522 and 47 U.S.C. § 605-(2000)).
104 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000).
105 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
106 Kesan, supra note 19, at 295-99;
Wilborn, supra note 19, at 839-41;
Robinson, supra note 19, at 313-20; Richman, supra note 19, at 1349-50; Watson, supra
note 19, at 87-88. One obstacle about which there has been some litigation is whether
the monitoring of e-mails constitutes an "interception" within the meaning of the
ECPA. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 314-16. The determinative factor may be
whether the e-mail is in transit or in storage. Id. at 315. See also Frayer, supra note 19,
at 866-67 (discussing the few judicial interpretations of "intercept"). Even if a plaintiff
is able to establish an interception under a court's interpretation of the term, however,
there are several exceptions that pose formidable hurdles. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note
19, at 296-98; Robinson, supra note 19, at 316-18. But see Smith v. Devers, 01-T-551-N,
2002 WL 75803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer on a Federal Wiretap Act claim).
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statute's limitations regarding protection against computer
monitoring."'7
Although often overlooked in debates about computer
monitoring, one federal statute that may provide some
protection is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."' Most
obviously, it is an unfair labor practice to conduct surveillance
of union activities in a workplace where employees are
represented by a union, or where union organizing is being
conducted." Thus, if an employer is conducting general
monitoring, and employees are discussing union organizing or
other union activities, the employer may have committed an
°
unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA."
The lesser-known aspect of the NLRA is that all
employees, whether represented by a union or not, with the
exceptions specifically enumerated in the Act, have the right
under § 7.' to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection. "For purposes
of mutual aid or protection" has been interpreted broadly to
include most matters relating to terms or conditions of
employment." ' Thus, monitoring of employees who are
discussing work conditions via e-mail may be an unfair labor
practice. Establishing rules prohibiting such communications
3
also may constitute an unfair labor practice."
Turning to common law, the tort of invasion of privacy
4
also applies to computer monitoring." There are four branches
or versions of the tort: intrusion upon seclusion; public
disclosure of private facts; false light; and appropriation of
name or likeness."5 The branch relevant in the employment

107

Richman, supra note 19, at 1350-52. Connecticut is an exception, as it

enacted a law that requires employers to give employees prior written notification of
electronic monitoring. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1) (West 2000).
1" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). Regarding applicability of the NLRA to
electronic invasions of privacy, see William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of
the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 259 (2002); Frayer, supra note 19, at 862-64.
109 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 127 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992).
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
' 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
112 See Corbett, supra note 108, at
282-83.
13 Id. at 291-95.
114 Kesan, supra note 19, at 302-04; Kim, supra note 17, at 688-98.
19, at 302-04; Kim, supra note 17, at 688-98;
",5 Kesan, supra note
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE
TORTS: RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 198 (1991).
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context is intrusion upon seclusion."' The tort's three prima
facie elements are: (1) an intentional invasion or intrusion; (2)
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) occurring
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy."' On the
whole, employees suing their employers for the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion have fared about as poorly as employees suing
their employers for intentional infliction of emotional distress
8

(IIED)."

The weak track record exists for two reasons. First, the
requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive to a
reasonable person prevents trivial privacy invasions from being
actionable."' This element is roughly analogous to the outrage
element in intentional infliction of emotional distress. It seems,
however, that courts have not set the bar as high for "highly
offensive" as they have for "outrageous." An intrusion must be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, whereas for outrage to
be satisfied, the act must be such that civilized society should
not tolerate it. Plaintiffs often plead both IIED and invasion of
privacy when complaining of abuse in the workplace. However,
the outrage element is too difficult to satisfy when the act
complained of is electronic monitoring.'0
Most invasion of privacy claims in the employment
context fail because courts find either that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, or that the invasion would
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person, or both."'
Attorneys and consultants routinely advise employers to
establish written e-mail and computer use policies, to tell
employees that they can and will be monitored,'2 and to have

116 Kesan, supra note 19, at 302;
Kim, supra note 17, at 688. Professor
Makdisi describes the intrusion upon seclusion branch as being more aligned with
dignitary insult, whereas the other three are aligned with property-like alienation
issues. Makdisi, supra note 20, at 983.
117 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 426, at 1200 (2001).
118 See generally Kim, supra
note 17.
1,9 See PERRITT, supra note
115, at 204-05; Kim, supra note 17, at 691-92;
Kesan, supra note 19, at 302-03.
120 Kesan, supra note 19, at
302; see also Smith v. Devers, 01-T-551-N, 2002
WL 75803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer on invasion of privacy claim, but affirming on IED claim).
121 The line between the two elements
is indistinct, and courts often blend
them into one in their analysis. Kesan, supra note 19, at 302; see also PERRITT, supra
note 115, at 203-04.
122 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note
56, at 870 (Lawyers "routinely advise their
clients to deny employees any expectation of privacy."); Focus On... Employee Privacy,
INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RIGHTS (BNA), Aug. 6, 2002 (No. 18), at 72 (discussing

20031

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

111

the policy.tn
employees sign an acknowledgment regarding
Nevertheless, even without such policies, courts often find that
the employees cannot have a reasonable expectation of much
privacy in the workplace.' 24 Perhaps the most extreme example
is in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,12i in which the court rejected the
plaintiffs privacy expectation even though the employer had
assured employees that it would not monitor e-mail and use
2 6
information obtained to discipline or fire employees.
Moreover, even if courts conclude that an employee has or may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, they still may hold
that the intrusion is not highly offensive because the
rights. 7
employer's interests outweigh the employee's privacy
A second problem with the intrusion tort is the Catch-22
that occurs when employers attempt to invade a zone of
privacy. If the employee blocks the invasion, then the employee
often is fired and cannot successfully sue because no privacy
invasion occurred.' 2' Alternatively, if the employee permits the
intrusion to occur, a claim for invasion of privacy often fails on
the rationale that the employee consented to the intrusion."n
Commentators generally have concluded that existing
law is inadequate to address abusive electronic monitoring in
the workplace. One scholar summarized his review of the
federal and state law by saying that law in the United States
attorney/speaker's advice to human resource managers to fashion and communicate a
clear policy that "reserv[es] the right to search and destroy any reasonable expectation
of privacy" ). See also Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2002 WL 974676 (D.
Mass. May 7, 2002).
123 Kesan, supra note 19, at 304-05 ("At common law, then, an employer may
from liability by informing employees of a monitoring program.").
itself
insulate
at 305; Wilborn, supra note 19, at 846 ('For example, an employee's
121 Id.
office, desk, or locker may be held to be the employer's property and thus, not
private."). See also Makdisi, supra note 20, at 998-1002 (writing about application of
intrusion upon solitude to genetic testing and recommending abrogation of a
mechanical application of the "public places rule"- courts grant summary judgment in
cases in which the alleged intrusion occurred in a public place, on the rationale that
there can be no expectation of privacy in a public place).
125 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"" Id. at 101 ("Wle do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the company
e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be
intercepted by management.").
127 See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *2. ('Even if plaintiffs have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their work e-mail, defendant's legitimate business
interest in protecting its employees from harassment in the workplace would likely
trump plaintiffs' privacy interests.").
12S See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska
supra note 17, at 675-76.
Kim,
1989);
129 See, e.g., Luedtke, 768 P.2d 1123; Kim, supra note 17, at 676.
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does not protect "a zone of privacy in the workplace.""
Although that conclusion seems too severe, if he means there is
no absolute right of privacy that will prevail regardless of the
interests the employer throws onto the scales, then it is
certainly true that the zone is minuscule. Indeed, the legal
approach in the United States has been to individually address
each method or device used to invade privacy rather than
trying to protect a zone of privacy against invasion by all
means or devices.' 3 ' The only general source of privacy
protection for most employees in the private sector is the
common law.'32
b. Genetic Discrimination
As with electronic monitoring and other privacy issues,
public employees can state claims for invasion of privacy under
the Constitution, although the Supreme Court has not yet
decided a case involving an individual's privacy interest in her
genetic information.' 33 There is no federal legislation that
explicitly prohibits
genetic testing of employees
or
discrimination against them on the basis of information
obtained by such testing." There is a federal statute, the
Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability
Act
(HIPAA),'35 which generally prohibits group health insurance
plans from using genetic information to make rules regarding
initial eligibility or continued eligibility for coverage. '
However, while relevant to the employment setting because
most employees have health coverage through their
employers,'37 HIPAA does not prohibit employers from
requesting or requiring employees to submit to genetic testing,
or from discriminating in employment on the basis of genetic
information.
Also at the federal level, President Clinton issued
Executive Order Number 13,145, entitled "To Prohibit
M

130

Kesan, supra note 19, at 322.

131 Kim, supra note 17,
at 674.
132

Id. at 675.

133 Miller, supra note 20, at
251-52.
134

Id. at 237.

135 Pub. L. No. 104-191,

110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
136 Miller, supra note 20, at 255; Feldman
& Katz, supra note 20, at 406-07.
137 See Kim, supra note 20,
at 1502.
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Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic
Information.' 3. The Executive Order prohibits discrimination
based on protected genetic information in all civilian federal
Employment
Equal
The
employment.'39
government
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has interpreted the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prohibit genetic
discrimination. 0 As recounted above, the EEOC has settled the
one case in which it filed suit for genetic discrimination under
the ADA.' The crux of the EEOC interpretation is that genetic
defects and predisposition to diseases or conditions can be
covered under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of
"disability.""' Whether courts will defer to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA remains to be seen.'43 Title VII may
also be invoked in a case of genetic discrimination if a case can
be made under the disparate impact theory, but that depends
on establishing a high correlation between the incidence of a
particular genetic marker or predisposition, and a protected
class under Title VII.' 44
At the state level, thirty-one states have enacted one or
more statutes addressing genetic testing and its uses in the
workplace.' There is a wide variety among the statutes in the
extent to which they restrict employers from requesting or
requiring genetic testing and using such information to make
employment decisions.' 4
As with electronic monitoring, the tort theory of
invasion of privacy may also be applied to genetic testing.
Although there are no reported decisions of this type, the
theory has been applied to drug and other types of testing, and

13"Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
139 Miller, supra note 20, at 249.
...Id. at 238-47 (citing 2 U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Order 915.002,
at 902-45 (1995)).
141 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
142 Miller, supra note 20, at 238-47; Kim, supra note 20, at 1514.
143 Miller, supra note 20, at 241 (stating that "the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance can be used as persuasive authority" but "the guidance does not have the
same force of law as a federal statute or regulation").
144 Kim, supra note 20, at 1513; Miller, supra note 20, at 247-48; Feldman &
Katz, supra note 20, at 404-05.
141 See
Nat'l Human Genome Res. Inst., Report on Employment
Discrimination State Legislation, at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/Policyand-publicaffairs/Legislationlworkplace.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2003) [hereinafter NHGRI
Website].
146 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 20, at 259-63 (surveying state legislation);
Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 410-16 (same).
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should fare at least as well with genetic testing.'47 Indeed, at
least one commentator's survey of the intrusion upon seclusion
cases imbues her with optimism regarding the flexibility of the
intrusion tort and its application to genetic testing.'48 Another,
while not specifically calling for a common law tort response,
argues that genetic discrimination should be treated as an
issue of protecting employee privacy. '"
In sum, there is existing statutory and common law that
applies to both of these emerging types of workplace privacy
invasion. On balance, however, many commentators deem this
law inadequate to address the problems. With respect to
statutes, only the recently enacted state statutes on genetic
testing and discrimination expressly refer to one of these types
of invasions. For all of the other statutes, courts may interpret
them as applicable to these invasions or they may not.
As for the tort theories, principally invasion of privacy,
the inadequacy stems from courts generally favoring
employers' interests over employees' privacy interests, and
consequently skewing the tort doctrine and analysis in favor of
employers. Given the dearth of protection afforded employees
by existing law in the face of scientific and technological
developments that can penetrate deeply into areas of employee
privacy, it was predictable that commentators and employee
rights advocates would propose new law. Given the history of
employment law in this country, it also is not surprising that
most have favored new legislation rather than adjustments to
existing common law.

147 Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1002-12. Although
not an employment case, the
application of the invasion of privacy tort to clandestine genetic testing arose in Doe v.
High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). In that case, a student gave
a blood sample for a rubella test, and the sample also was tested for HIV without his
knowledge or consent. The court characterized plaintiffs intrusion upon seclusion
claim as "improper appropriation of private information resulting from the HIV test
that was performed without his knowledge or consent." Id. at 1065. Finding a privacy
interest in a person's blood sample and the information that may be gleaned from it,
the court went on to hold that the unauthorized testing would be found by a reasonable
person to be highly offensive. Id. at 1071.
141 Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1019
("[T]he intrusion tort is a viable means of
preserving privacy rights in a variety of contexts and . . . it has been enlarged to
consider more specialized categories of intrusions, including sexual harassment and
drug testing in the employment context.").
149 Kim, supra note
20, at 1551.
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3. Protecting Privacy: Proposals
a. Electronic Monitoring
Legislation has been introduced at the federal and state
levels to regulate electronic monitoring of employees. The
general thrust of proposed legislation has been not to restrict
monitoring to specific circumstances (such as when an
employer has a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing), but
instead to require employers to give notice to employees of
their monitoring practices. The first legislation proposed at the
federal level was the ill-fated Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act (PCWA). It was principally, but not exclusively,
a notice bill. 5' Despite being approved by a House
subcommittee,"' the bill died what one commentator termed a
"mysterious death" in committee."u
The progeny of the PCWA rose up in 2000 with the
introduction in Congress of the Notice of Electronic Monitoring
Act (NEMA).5 NEMA was less ambitious and even less
restrictive than the PCWA - a "lean and mean" notice bill." It
did not prohibit any kind of monitoring, but required notice
when an employee begins employment and then annual
renotification." The notice had to cover the following: the form
of communication or computer use to be monitored; how the
monitoring would be done; the kinds of information that would
be obtained; the frequency of monitoring; and how the gathered
information would be used.'57 Size and attitude of the lean and
mean bill notwithstanding, NEMA, like its progenitor, died in
Congress, the victim of lobbying by business interests."

" H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993). The bills were
introduced in the 1989-90 term and in subsequent terms, but no hearings were held.
Wilborn, supra note 19, at 849 n.94.
151
Wilborn, supra note 19, at 849-50; Frayer, supra note 19, at 869.
152

Labor Subpanel Approves Measure to CurtailElectronic Monitoring,
DAILY

LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 24, 1994 (No. 36), at D14.
'
Frayer, supra note 19, at 868; see also Wilborn, supra note 19, at 851 n.105
(noting the committees in which the bills stalled and died).
"
H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000). For detailed discussions of the bill, see
Watson, supra note 19, and Frayer, supra note 19.
' Frayer, supra note 19, at 869.
6 Id. at 870; Watson, supra note 19, at 93.
117 H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(b)(1)-(4)
(2001).
"s Business Coalition Blocks Markup of Bill Requiring Electronic Monitoring

Notification, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 15, 2000 (No. 180), at A9; Frayer, supra
note 19, at 871.
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State legislation to require notice has also been
proposed. In 2001, for the third consecutive year, the California
legislature passed an electronic monitoring notice bill,' 9 and for
the third time in three years Democratic Governor Gray Davis
vetoed the bill." The bill would have required employers to
notify employees either in writing or electronically of the
employer's workplace privacy and electronic monitoring policies
and practices."' Governor Davis, in the message accompanying
his veto, recognized the legitimate need for employers to
monitor and stated, "This bill places unnecessary and
complicating obligations on employers and may lead to
litigation by affected employees over whether the required
notice was provided and whether it was read and understood
by the employee....
Some commentators favor a legislative approach to
electronic monitoring, while others favor a notice law such as
NEMA. 2 Professor S. Elizabeth Wilborn, for example, favors a
legislative solution, but does not think that the PCWA did
enough because it was primarily a notice bill that would not
have restricted the amount or scope of monitoring." She favors
comprehensive federal legislation that expressly states that
employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in the
workplace, requires employers to demonstrate a legitimate
business interest in order to justify monitoring, requires
employers who satisfy that burden to use the least intrusive
means of monitoring available, and creates incentives for
employers to use content-neutral monitoring techniques."
Another commentator favors, as part of larger privacy reforms,
federal privacy legislation that limits the circumstances under
which employers could electronically monitor, and prohibits

'9 S. 147, 107th Cong. (2001).
PrivacyBill for Employee E-Mail Vetoed for Third Time by California Gov.
Davis, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Oct. 11, 2001 (No. 195) [hereinafter Privacy Bill for
Employee E-Mail]. See generally Kesan, supra note 19 (discussing state and federal law
applicable to electronic monitoring).
161 S.147, 107th Cong. (2001).
162 PrivacyBill for Employee E-Mail, supra note
160.
16 Frayer, supra note 19, at 874 (recommending passage of NEMA); Richman,
'

supra note 19, at 1361 ("A statute like the PCWA would send a strong message to
employers and employees about liability for harms created by workers and the right to
workplace privacy . . . ."); Watson, supra note

19, at 101 (stating that NEMA

represented a "significant compromise by both sides in the debate").
164 Wilborn, supra note 19, at 851.
165

Id.

at 880-81.
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employment policies and agreements in which employees agree
to such monitoring."
Most commentators hold out little hope for state
legislative solutions for reasons such as business groups'
lobbying and the ill fit between law limited by state boundaries
and technology that realizes boundariless communication. 117 At
least one commentator has suggested that a federal notice law
that provides little privacy protection could provide impetus for
passage of more protective state legislation."
Other commentators favor using the common law to
address monitoring. One possibility is a tort approach that
recognizes a public policy of employees' privacy rights in the
workplace, and uses the tort theory of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy to limit the employment-at-will
doctrine."' Another proposal is a contract approach
incorporating principles that permit employers and employees
to achieve their legitimate expectations in monitoring and
privacy, respectively. 7 '
b. Genetic Discrimination
There are numerous calls for federal legislation on
genetic discrimination, many by amending Title VII or the
ADA.'71 The Clinton administration, for example, called for
federal legislation banning genetic testing in employment. 2
Even the former Commissioner of the EEOC, Paul Miller, said
that "additional legislation may be needed," notwithstanding
the EEOC's position that the ADA covers genetic
discrimination.7 ' Several bills on genetic testing and genetic
discrimination in insurance and employment have been

166 Spencer, supra note 56, at 912.
167
'6

Kesan, supra note 19, at 301-02; Wilborn, supra note 19, at 842-43.
Frayer, supra note 19, at 874 (recommending passage of NEMA, "which

would serve as the foundation and inspiration for more expansive state and federal
legislation in the future").
169 Kim, supra note 17, at 720-29.
170 Kesan, supra note 19, at 322-32.
171 Feldman & Katz, supra note 20; Brian M. Holt, Comment,
Genetically
Defective: The Judicial Interpretation of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Fails to
Protect Against Genetic Discriminationin the Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457
(2002); Wukitsch, supra note 20.
172 Miller,supra note 20, at 264.
173Miller, supra note 20, at 265.
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introduced since 1997.' In the most recent session of Congress,
although the Bush administration announced it supported
genetic discrimination legislation, 5 the bills bogged down in
House and Senate committees under questions of overlap with
the ADA, HIPAA, and other laws.176
One commentator, addressing genetic privacy beyond
the employment context, viewed the tort theory of invasion of
privacy, primarily the intrusion upon seclusion branch, as
adequate to address the problems if the theory were tweaked.'
While not specifying whether she favors a legislative or
common law approach, Professor Pauline Kim argues that
genetic intrusion is better addressed under a privacy rights
model than an anti-discrimination model.'78 In discussing a
number of the issues under a privacy rights model, Kim did not
create a template for legislation.'71 Kim, who also has written
about electronic monitoring, favored a common law approach to
that invasion of privacy issue,"n because it involves balancing of
interests and is thus ill-suited to a statutory approach.
Most proposals for new law to address electronic
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination have been
legislative approaches. The principal weakness of this approach
is that it does not recognize that statutes lack the flexibility
required to balance the interests of employers and employees in
matters of privacy. General or specific prohibitions can be
articulated in statutes, but such unqualified prohibitions are
not necessary or desirable in this area. By and large,
commentators and law reformers have selected a tool too blunt
for this delicate job, which requires calibrating that can only be
achieved through the common law.

174
175

Id.; Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 409.
See Democrats Welcome Bush's Statement on Genetic Discrimination

Legislation,DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), June 26, 2001 (No. 122), at A8.
176 Sen. Kennedy to Address Genetic Bias Bill's Overlap of ADA, Privacy
Regulations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap in Genetic
Bias Legislation Is Examined in House Hearing on Bill, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July
12, 2001 (No. 133), at As.
177 Makdisi,
supra note 20, at 978-79 ("As in many other areas where
statutory protections are inadequate to guard against a perceived harm, the viability of
common law actions for intrusion upon genetic privacy is critical.").
178 Kim, supra note 20, at 1551.
171 Id. at 1543.
,so See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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Bullying
1. Bullying: Definition and Examples

Workplace bullying may be the "corporate buzzword for
the new millennium, pushing sexual harassment from its
perch."'' The problem has virtually spawned an industry of its
own. There are organizations that maintain websites, conduct
conferences, and sponsor legislation to eradicate workplace
harassment."2 There are companies that will perform audits,
identify bullying in workplaces, and attempt to eliminate it."
Reports of workplace abuse are legion, ranging from the
insensitive to the utterly inhumane. A recent cause c~l~bre is
by no means the worst case, but it does demonstrate the
senseless workplace meanness often perpetrated by the
powerful upon the powerless. According to the complaint of
Jodee Berry, a waitress at a Hooters restaurant in Panama
City, Florida, management announced that the waitress who
sold the most beer in a month would win a Toyota."' When Ms.
Berry sold the most beer, she was blindfolded and taken out to
the restaurant's parking lot, where she expected to be
presented with her new car. Instead, when the blindfold was
removed, she saw a toy Yoda doll (the Jedi Master from the
Star Wars movies). She quit and sued for breach of contract
and fraud. Although the restaurant manager contended that
the contest was an April Fools' Day joke, the corporate owner of
the restaurant settled the case, agreeing to give Ms. Berry a
new car."
A case in Texas, GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce," has
garnered considerable attention and been published in some
case books as an exemplar of the tort of intentional infliction of

181

Karlak, supra note 16.

182 In the United States, there is The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute

(formerly the Campaign Against Workplace Bullying). See supra note 16. In the United
Kingdom, there is a UK National Workplace Bullying Advice Line. See Bully OnLine
Website, at http://www.bullyonline.org/workbully/index.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
'
See Karlak, supra note 16. Envisionworks is such a company. See
Envisionworks Website, at http://www.envisionworks.net (lasted visited August 9,
2003).
" Associated Press, Judge Says Waitress Can Sue Hooters in "Toy-Yoda"
Case, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 2001, at B6.
'85 See, e.g., Ex-Hooters Waitress Settles Suit, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
May 10, 2002, at 9; What a Hoot, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at P13.
1
998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
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emotional distress.' 7 The case involved a male supervisor who
managed a small office. Three employees sued for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the supervisor engaged
in frequent profanity-laced tirades,' required employees to
perform redundant janitorial chores, had employees stand
before him for extended periods while he stared at them, and
frequently threatened employees with termination.'89 Perhaps
most memorably, this "bull" of a supervisor would lower his
head, straighten his arms by his sides and ball up his fists, and
lunge at employees, stopping just short of making contact with
their faces as he screamed at them."9
The Texas Supreme Court embraces a strong version of
the employment-at-will doctrine, and in employment settings
the court has been loath to recognize tort theories, 9 ' including
intentional infliction of emotional distress.'" Indeed, the court
in GTE Southwest stated that because many aspects of
managing a business are unpleasant for employees, Texas
courts "have adopted a strict approach to intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims arising in the workplace."'93 But the
conduct of the supervisor in this case was so severe and
occurred so regularly that even the Texas Supreme Court
concluded it should not be expected in the workplace or
tolerated in a civilized society."
2. Bully Busting: Inadequacy of Current Law
There exist only two types of law that address
harassment or abuse in the workplace. The first type is the
harassment theories under Title VII and the other employment
anti-discrimination laws. The second type is tort law, primarily
187 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 498 (4t ed. 2001).
188 The "F word" and the "MF word" apparently were
two of his favorites.
When one employee asked him to stop because it was offensive, he got in front of her
face and screamed, "I will do and say any damn thing I want." GTE Southwest, 998
S.W.2d at 613.
9 Id. at 613-14.
190

Id.

Texas recognizes a narrow version of the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.
1985); Johnson v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
192 Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702 (stating that aside from cases involving
sexual harassment, employees rarely succeed on IIED claims).
'93 GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at 612.
" Id. at 617.
191

2003]

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

121

the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Commentators have argued that the two types of law provide
inadequate protection. 9 '
Regarding harassment law, the limitation on coverage
of abusive conduct in the workplace is obvious. One who cannot
prove that abusive conduct is because of sex, or race, or some
other protected characteristic cannot recover, no matter how
bad the conduct. This limitation is even more severe than it
appears at first blush. When harassment is because of a
protected characteristic has been a much-litigated issue." The
result has been that in many cases involving sexual conduct,
the plaintiff cannot recover because a court reasons that the
because-of-sex requirement is not satisfied.
The Supreme Court addressed a because-of-sex issue in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.'97 In that case, the
Court held that a claim does not fail to satisfy the requirement
simply because it is same-sex sexual harassment. The Court
did note, however, that the requirement is harder to satisfy in
such cases. The Court's opinion also includes statements that
appellate courts have relied upon to deny recovery in a number
of subsequent sexual (and other) harassment cases. Rejecting
the argument that it was transforming Title VII into "a general
civility code for the American workplace,"198 the Court stated
that "'[tihe critical issue ... is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."..
As for tort law, plaintiffs have prevailed on IIED claims
in workplace settings in only a small percentage of cases."'
Courts often dispose of the cases on summary judgment,

195

See infra Part II.B.2.

'9 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation
Problem in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002).
197 523
'98

U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 80.

9 Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring)). Professor David Schwartz criticizes the Oncale decision for its rejection
of the "sex per se" shortcut to proving "because of sex." Schwartz, supra note 196, at
1703, 1728-48. By this he means that "sexual conduct in the workplace is always,
without more, 'because of sex.'" Id. at 1705.
200PERRITT, supra note 115, at 265, 268-76; Regina Austin, Employer
Abuse,
Worker Resistance, and the Tort Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1998); Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702 ("Despite the apparent
openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees rarely succeed."); Ehrenreich, supra
note 23, at 55-56; Summers, supra note 24, at 74 ("Suits for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are seldom successful.").
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finding that the high threshold of "outrageous" conduct (so bad
that civilized society should not tolerate it) is not met. The
most successful type of IIED case typically involves sexual
The most likely reason for courts' reluctance to
harassment.'
permit recovery on IIED claims for workplace abuse is their
concern that the tort theory will become a way to circumvent
the employment-at-will doctrine, thus serving as a stealthy
wrongful discharge claim."2
Other tort theories, such as battery and false
imprisonment,2 3 have applied to some cases of workplace
abuse, but they do not apply to general abusive conduct.2 In
cases of sexual harassment,' plaintiffs have also successfully
used the tort theory of invasion of privacy (intrusion upon
seclusion branch)." In some cases involving abusive discharge,
plaintiffs have also used the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy, but most states require identification
of a definite public policy, 7 as well as harm to society at large not just to the individual - that will follow from not imposing
liability for the discharge."
Many commentators thus deem current law inadequate
to protect against workplace bullying. Harassment theory
under employment anti-discrimination law is too narrow in its
"because of" requirement. As for tort law, plaintiffs
infrequently prevail on IIED claims because one of its elements

20'Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702; Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification"of Labor
and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 404 (1994). See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 69 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding that sexual harassment
constituted outrageous conduct and affirming $10 million judgment for employee,
including $8 million in exemplary damages), review granted, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 181
(Tex. Oct. 31, 2002).
202See, e.g., Austin, supra note 200, at 9 ("The courts are particularly wary of
attempts to use [IIED] to evade the rules sanctioning the summary discharge of at-will
employees."); Duffy, supra note 201, at 396.
103 See Ehrenreich, supra
note 23, at 22.
See, e.g., Miraliakbari v. Pennicooke, 561 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(dismissing claim for false imprisonment).
205 See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc.,
435 So. 2d 705 (Ala.
1983); see also Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1006-07.
206See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of
this tort theory.
207See, e.g., Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Gardner v.
Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).
2m See cases cited supra note 207; PERRITT, supra note 115, at ch. 3; Parker,
supra note 23, at 392-402.
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3. Bully Busting: Proposals
Among academic commentators calling for legal
responses to workplace abuse and harassment, " one writes
that "no one has attempted systematically to define when
workplace humiliation should be actionable."2 ° Professor David
Yamada and the Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute have
been at the vanguard of efforts to fashion new statutory law to
prohibit workplace bullying."' Indeed, the Institute reports that
in 2003, California will become the first state in which the
proposed legislation is introduced in the state legislature.2' The
proposed legislation, designed for enactment at the state or
federal level, would create a cause of action called "intentional
infliction of a hostile work environment."1 3 Essentially,
Professor Yamada uses the elements of a hostile work
environment harassment claim under Title VII," ' including the
Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense if the harassment does
not culminate in a "tangible employment action."2 5' Thus, what

20 See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 16; Fisk, supra note 16;
Ehrenreich, supra
note 23; Austin, supra note 200.
210 Fisk, supra note 16,
at 73.
211 See supra note 16.
212 See The Workplace Bullying & Trauma
Institute Website, supra note 16.
2,3 Yamada, supra note 16, at 524-28.
214 Although sexual harassment law is the best known type of harassment
law, hostile work environment claims are recognized on all bases covered by Title VII,
as well as the ADEA and the ADA.
215 Yamada, supra note 16, at 524. Yamada defines
the statutory theory of
intentional infliction of a hostile work environment this way:
In order to prove intentional infliction of a hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant employer, its agent, or both, intentionally subjected the plaintiff to
a hostile work environment. A hostile work environment is one that is
deemed hostile by both the plaintiff and by a reasonable person in the
plaintiffs situation. Employers are to be held vicariously liable for hostile
work environments intentionally created by their agents.

Id.

The prima facie cause of action outlined immediately above makes employers
strictly liable for the abusive behavior of their employees. This alone provides
employers with a strong incentive to prevent workplace bullying. However,
the law also should reward proactive attempts to prevent bullying and to
effectively address allegations that bullying has occurred. Accordingly, under
this proposed legal framework, when an employer is sued for the acts of an
agent that allegedly created a hostile work environment, it shall be an
affirmative defense for the employer only if:
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he advocates is "status-blind hostile work environment"
legislation."'
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich has offered a different
approach to workplace harassment."7 She argues for a
pluralistic approach to harassment in which adjusted tort law
theories, principally IIED, augment sexual harassment and
other harassment theories under the anti-discrimination laws.
Although the focus of her proposal is a fuller understanding
and treatment of sexual harassment in the law, her proposal
would also benefit those who suffer abuse but cannot recover
under the anti-discrimination laws. 28

Among the proposals for new law to address statusneutral workplace harassment, those invoking new statutes
are misguided. Harassment and abuse are concepts that are too
amorphous to be prohibited by statute. Any statute would say,
in effect, "Don't be mean." Although the principle is laudatory,
this clearly is a misuse of legislation as a regulatory
mechanism, as it would provide no guidance whatsoever.
Moreover, since it would likely be so vague, the statute would
not alter the case-by-case adjudication that takes place now
under the common law protections. It would thus be ineffective
and superfluous. By contrast, adjusting common law tort
theories would fine-tune the law and harmonize it with societal
needs on a case-by-case basis, as well as avoid adding
unnecessary law to an already crowded legislative field.
III. THE PATCHWORK OF EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES

Making the case for common law rather than legislative
approaches to workplace problems requires an overview of the
current state of labor and employment law in the United
States, and a brief history of the development of that law. This
section devotes considerable attention to the employment-atwill doctrine because of its pervasiveness and centrality in U.S.
(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any actionable behavior; and,
(b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise.

Id. at 527.
2,6Id. at 523.

Ehrenreich, supra note 23.
' Id. at 61.

217
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employment law. Furthermore, the power and prerogative
vested in employers under employment at will have so skewed
common law analysis by courts that it is not surprising that
employee rights advocates have little confidence in the common
law and instead favor employment legislation. Still, as this
section explains, the history of American employment law
provides good reasons to agitate for a reinvigorated common
law of the workplace.
A.

Employment at Will

The beginning point for assessing U.S. employment law
is the employment-at-will doctrine.2 " It is the hallmark of labor
and employment law in the United States, serving as the
default rule.. in most states for over a century. 21 The most oftquoted statement of the doctrine is that absent an agreement
to the contrary, employers can fire employees for a good reason,
a bad reason or no reason at all.2 2 Despite the dubious
proposition that someone can do something for no reason at all,
the now famous, or infamous, iteration of employment at will
encapsulates the absolute power of employers to govern the
workplace. Although employment at will expressly addresses
employers' absolute right to terminate employees, it is about
much more. One who has the power to terminate also has the
power to do as she pleases with respect to all terms and
conditions of employment." At its core, employment at will is
about employer power and prerogative.224

219 Summers, supra note 24, at 66 ("To understand
the American system,
therefore, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at will, its
fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary to
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.").
220 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV.

106 (2002).

221 Professor Andrew Morriss has studied the timing of
states' adoption of
employment at will. Andrew Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 681-82 (1994). In
1851 Maine was the first state to adopt the rule through common law. By 1908, most
states had adopted it by case law. Id. There is an extensive body of literature regarding
the origins of employment at will and reasons for the propagation and perpetuation of
the doctrine. See generally Summers, supra note 24, at 66-68; Parker, supra note 23, at
349-52.
222 See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,
520 (1884) ("All may
dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."), overruled
on othergrounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
222 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will
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The United States, the largest economy in the world, is
a maverick among industrialized nations in clinging to
employment at will."5 The member nations of the European
Union, for example, have substantially more employment
protection law than the United States."6 Other nations with
more protective labor laws look wistfully at the productive
economy and low unemployment of the United States, but they
disparage our limited legal regulation of the workplace and
slight protection of employee rights."7
comparatively
Employment at will is often credited with creating the
World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996) ("The surrounding at-will regime affects not
only the aftermath of an arguably wrongful discharge and the availability of a remedy;
it also affects employee conduct and dynamics at the workplace."); Summers, supra
note 24, at 65 ("Its tentacles reach into seemingly remote areas of labor law, for at its
roots is a fundamental legal assumption regarding the relations between an employer
and its employees."). Cf Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the
Other Half of the Employment-at-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REV. 97, 98 (1991) ("[I]t has
become associated with the more general principle that, absent a statute to the
contrary, an employer has the right to hire or fire any person for any reason.").
224 Summers, supra note 24, at 65 ("The law, by giving total dominance to the
employer, endows the employer with the divine right to rule the working lives of its
subject employees."). Cf Austin, supra note 200, at 8-12 (discussing the wide latitude
courts give employers to use abusive authority to direct employees' activities).
225 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 24, at 65 ("The United States, unlike almost
every other industrialized country and many developing countries, has neither adopted
through the common law or by statute a general protection against unfair dismissal or
discharge without just cause, nor even any period of notice."); Donald C. Dowling, Jr.,
The Practice of International Labor & Employment Law: Escort Your
Labor/Employment Clients into the Global Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 13 (2001)
("American businesses are steeped in their unique and peculiar employment-at-will
doctrine, which even other Anglo-system countries like England, Canada, and
Australia rejected years ago."). Unsurprisingly, The United States has not ratified the
convention of the International Labour Organization on Termination of Employment,
which provides that "employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker
or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or
service." International Labor Organization, Termination of Employment Convention,
June 22, 1982, available at http://www.ilo.org. The convention has been ratified by 32
countries.
26 Kohler, supra note 32, at 103-04 ("As is generally known, the United States
historically has provided comparatively meager formal legal protections of the
employment relationship. Foreign observers typically characterize us as a 'hire and
fire' society....").
227 See Roger Blanpain, Employment and Labour Law: The
European Union,
in COMPARATIVE LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET
ECONOMIES 129 (Roger Blanpain, et al. eds., 6' ed. 1998). Prime Minister Tony Blair of
the United Kingdom has championed the notion of a "third way," between the
deregulation, low labor standards, and low unemployment of the United States and the
United Kingdom on the one hand, and the heavy regulation, high labor standards, and
high unemployment of the European nations. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion: What
the Experiences of the Recent Past Tell Us About the Labor and Employment Law of the
Future, 76 IND. L. J. 177, 183 (2001) (comments of Professor Catherine Barnard of
Trinity College, Cambridge University).
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flexibility in the United States labor market, although that
proposition is dubious."
B.

Employment Law Expansion by Legislation and
Common Law

Despite its notoriety, employment at will does not, of
course, reign unchecked in the United States. The current
landscape of labor and employment law in the United States is
a patchwork of federal legislation and related case law, as well
as state legislation and common law tort and contract theories.
At the federal level, the Wagner Act (NLRA) was enacted in
1935."' The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) followed in
1938." The FLSA represented a different approach to legal
regulation of the workplace than that of the NLRA. The NLRA
sought to invest the weaker party, workers, with more power so
that they could decide what they wanted from the employer,
make their demands known, and obtain whatever their
collective power enabled them to obtain. Section 7, the heart of
the Act, recognized the following general rights of employees:
self-organizing;
forming, joining,
or
assisting
labor
organizations; bargaining collectively through representatives
of their own choosing; engaging in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection; and the right to abstain from the foregoing
activities." Everything that was legal was on the table under
the NLRA - workers could try to obtain whatever they
wanted." Other than the broad § 7 rights, the NLRA made
228

John

T.

Addison,

The

U.S. Employment Miracle in Comparative

Perspective, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 283, 291(1998); Kohler, supra note 32, at 106
(stating this commonly held belief, but questioning it).
229 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 15169 (2000)).

230Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (2000)).
23129 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
232 See Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union FederalEmployment Policy, 24

HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLCY 489, 490 (2001) (describing the NLRA as "constitutive,"
establishing a framework for employees to obtain for themselves what the employment
laws provide by direct intervention). Senator Wagner's legislative assistant and the
principal draftsman of the statute, Leon Keyserling, said, "'[It was our view that the
greatest contribution to greater equity and the distribution of the product between
wages and profit would come, not through the definition of terms by government, but
by the process of collective bargaining with labor placed in a position nearer to

equality." Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling
on Draftingthe Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 297 (1987).
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nothing an inalienable right of the workers. In contrast, the
FLSA declared a minimum wage, a maximum number of hours
before overtime was due, and minimum ages for engaging in
work and for certain types of work. Thus, unlike the NLRA, the
FLSA established minimum rights, mandated by Congress,
which cannot be altered through bargaining between employer
and employee.
In 1960 there were only two generally applicable federal
labor acts. Beginning in 1963, a plethora of federal employment
laws were enacted,"n from the Equal Pay Act in 1963 to the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993. Since then the
expansion has stopped at the federal level. There have been
numerous bills introduced in Congress, but none enacted. Still,
the period of 1963-1993 witnessed a proliferation of federal
employment legislation - at least compared with the history of
labor and employment law in this nation before the 1960s."
States also have been very active in the last four
decades in creating employment law, both by legislation and
case law. 3 ' Some state statutes more or less track analogous
federal statutes, such as state employment discrimination
statutes, 36' while others create rights not recognized by federal
law. Among the types of employment laws enacted by state
legislatures are workers' compensation acts, wage payment
acts, covenant-not-to-compete laws, employment reference
statutes, and a variety of other individual employment rights
statutes. State courts have also recognized numerous contract
and tort theories of recovery, including implied contracts,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
promissory estoppel, wrongful termination in violation of public
policy, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress."' Wrongful discharge in violation of public
233
2.3

See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., George Nicolau, A Comparison of Union and Non-Union Employee

Protectionsin Ireland and the United States, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 33, 34 (2001) ("There
has been, in the United States, over the last four decades, what I have called
elsewhere, the 'Europeanization of the American workplace'-an overlay of protective
legislation that is relatively new and which introduces protections that largely did not
exist before the 1960s.").
M5 Rothstein, supra note 223; Kohler, supra note 32,
at 106-07; Michael D.
Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel: Extending the Public Policy
Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997).
236 See Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel
State and Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 499
(1997).
" See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 32, at 120-21.
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policy is a tort created specifically for the employment setting,'
and it is the most recent tort to gain general acceptance
throughout the nation.2"'
It is fair to say that the hire-and-fire employment law
regime of the United States has developed a considerable body
of employment regulation since 1960.29 Reasons commonly
assigned for the high level of activity at both the state and
federal level, through both legislation and case law
development, are the concurrent precipitous decline in union
representation in the 1960s through the 1990s' and the
emergence of an individual employee rights approach to
regulating employment. Indeed, Congress has abandoned the
collective rights regime of collective bargaining and
wholeheartedly embraced the individual rights approach to
regulating employment.242 Yet the law would not leave
23s Professor

Mark Gergen distinguishes between wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy on the one hand, and collateral torts, such as defamation,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress on the other.
Gergen, supra note 28, at 1693. The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy actually can be traced to as early as 1959. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the

Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 849, 865 (1994) (citing California case). It did not take hold, however, until the
publication of Professor Lawrence Blade's pathbreaking article, Employment at Will vs.

Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1404 (1967). Professor Blades actually argued for a broader abusive discharge
tort than the current versions of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, but his
article fueled the debate over tort law's role in limiting employment at will. Id.
239 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 39, at 1547 (calling wrongful discharge the
most precarious of the four new successful torts-the other three being IIED, invasion of
privacy, and product liability). The only four states that do not recognize some version
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are Alabama, Louisiana, New York,
and Georgia. Even this listing is questionable because Louisiana has a statute that
codifies some branches of the tort. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 967 (2003). Montana does not
really recognize the tort, but it has a general wrongful discharge statute. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (2002).
240 See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 32, at 104 ("Despite our renown for relatively
abstemious public intervention in workplace relationships and our general preference
for private ordering, the previous ten to fifteen years has been a period of unusual
legislative and judicial activity."); Duffy, supra note 201, at 387-88 (discussing the
"rapid change" in U.S. employment law).
24, Union density in private sector employment
decreased from about a third
of the workforce at its height in the mid to late 1950s to less than ten percent by the

end of the century. Union Members Decline to 16.3 Million as Share of Employed Slips
to 13.5 Percent, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 19, 2001 (No. 13), at D16. Kohler, supra
note 32, at 104 (discussing declining union density as a reason for expansion of

employment law); Paul Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: The Handbook
Exception to Employment-At-Will, 4 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMP. POL'Y J. 231, 234-35
(2000) ("[U]nprecedented decline in union density and influence at the end of the 1970s
and beginning of the 1980s effectively eliminated collective bargaining as a genuine
alternative to the at-will regime.").
2A2 James

J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
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employees unprotected; individual rights laws began filling
gaps when union representation and collective bargaining were
not viable options, as was the case for most employees.2 3
Historically, then, the American workplace has been
regulated in several different ways,"' resulting in some
discernable divisions. First, employment law can be
implemented at either the federal or state level. Second, it can
be either statutory or common law. A third classification
divides employment law into the collective rights/bargaining
approach of the NLRA, and the individual rights approach that
has been the regulation of choice during the last fifty years.24
The individual rights approach includes federal and state
statutes, as well as state contract and tort theories of recovery.
Within the individual rights statutes, a further division
exists. There are minimum rights statutes that prohibit or
mandate specific actions by employers, and those that do not.
For example, the FLSA requires employers to pay a minimum
wage and overtime pay, and it restricts child labor. Likewise,
the FMLA mandates that employers grant employees up to
twelve weeks of leave for certain family and medical purposes.
Other examples include the WARN Act, which requires
employers to give sixty days notice of a plant closing or mass
layoff, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),
which prohibits employers from requiring employees to take
polygraph examinations, or from taking adverse employment
actions based on the results, except under certain
circumstances.
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1571 (1996) ("At some point during this legislative
barrage, it became clear that Congress viewed government regulation founded on
individual employment rights, rather than collective bargaining between private
entities, as the primary mechanism for ordering employment relations and
redistributing economic resources."); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to
Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union
Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 73 (1999) ("Since the 1960s, the labor
movement has suffered from American liberalism's rejection of the group basis of its
own past and its inability to find a place for group rights within the model of individual
rights it clings to so dearly.").
241 Summers, supra note 35, at 10 ("The consequence is foreseeable, if not
inevitable; if collective bargaining does not protect the individual employee, the law
will find another way to protect the weaker party.").
24 Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt discusses the strengths and weaknesses of
four different methods used to address the legal protection of workers: individual
bargaining, collective bargaining, legislative regulation, and development of the
common law. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 685.
245 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism:
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992).
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Those minimum rights statutes stand in contrast to the
anti-discrimination statutes. Although anti-discrimination laws
are a type of individual rights law and are usually classified as
minimum rights statutes, they differ from the foregoing
minimum rights laws in an important way. The FLSA, FMLA,
and other laws of that minimum-rights ilk require or prohibit
employer action, without addressing employers' motivation
(with the exception of the anti-retaliation provisions). In other
words, an employer paying below minimum wage or denying
the FMLA leave provisions violates the statute regardless of
the reason for the action. In contrast, the anti-discrimination
statutes do not prohibit employment actions unless they are
taken because of the employee's race, sex, disability, etc."' They
prohibit employment actions motivated by bad reasons.
The history of employment law in the United States
reveals different regulatory approaches to various issues at
various times. In the early part of the twentieth century, the
collective rights model prevailed through federal legislation.
The 1960s witnessed the beginning of the individual rights
regime, again through federal legislation. In turn, from the
1970s through the end of the century, the states created
individual employment rights through statutes and case law.
This evolution stemmed from the recognition that the one-sizefits-all approach of the NLRA did not work. The changing
landscape of employment in the United States required new
and different law at different times. In light of this diverse
history, one should not expect a single approach to work in the
next century. 7
C.

Regulating Firingand Other Terms and Conditions of
Employment

Much of the reform and debate in employment law
during the latter part of the twentieth century was about
limiting employment at will by recognizing different types of
law,
including
the
employment
wrongful
discharge
8
discrimination statutes." Although Title VII covers all types of

24"

See, e.g., Kim, supra note 20, at 1517.

Cf. Summers, supra note 35, at 24 ("I fear that because of the wide variety
of rights to be protected and our hesitant legal recognition of them, the solution must
be piecemeal and will inevitably be incomplete.").
24
See Estlund, supra note 223 (discussing the evolution and state of wrongful
discharge law); Parker, supra note 23 (discussing common law and legislative
24
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adverse employment actions, and at its inception was viewed
more as a means of addressing discriminatory refusals to hire,
most Title VII cases in the last twenty years or so have been
termination cases. 9 Harassment law under Title VII is the
most significant departure from a focus on wrongful discharge
under the employment discrimination statutes. Of course,
there have been laws that regulate terms and conditions of
employment other than discharge, such as the FLSA , the
FMLA , the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and the WARN Act at the
federal level, and workers' compensation and wage payment
statutes at the state level. Still, it is fair to say that the major
battle of the latter half of the twentieth century was largely
about employment at will and wrongful discharge.
Only one state in the nation has legislatively abrogated
employment at will, and no other state is poised to do so.
Moreover, statutory modifications of the at-will doctrine have
not so clearly favored employees claiming wrongful discharge."
In 1996, Arizona enacted the euphemistically named Arizona
Employment Protection Act, which consolidated the legal
theories that could be pursued in termination cases." ' The
Arizona Act was passed in reaction to a pro-employee decision
of the state supreme court, and most have understood it to be a
pro-employer effort to curtail tort and contract theories of
recovery."s Under the Arizona Act, employees can sue under
only the theories delineated therein, and the courts do not have
discretion to recognize other claims. Specifically, the Act
restricts courts from expanding the tort of wrongful discharge

approaches to employment at will).
249 John J.
Donohue III & Peter Seligmann, The Changing Nature of
Employment DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015-16 (1991).
2W Parker, supra note 23, at 373 ("Workers in other jurisdictions
could
probably expect the same pro-employer cast existing in the Montana legislation.").
? , ARIZ. REV. STAT. §41:1461 (1996).
252 The act was intended to stem the expansion of
wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy the Arizona legislature discerned in the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc) (the famous "Moon River" case). See Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona
Employment Protection Act: A Return to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1139 (1997) (describing the act as the "Legislature's response to the trend away
from employment-at-will that began in the mid-1980s"); Jenny Clevenger, Comment
and Legislative Review, Arizona's Employment Protection Act: Drawing a Line in the
Sand Between the Court and the Legislature, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (1997) (stating that
the act "effected dramatic changes . . . halting, and, in some instances, reversing the
expansion of employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting recovery in tort where
those rights are violated").
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in violation of public policy beyond legislatively recognized
policies.
Even the heralded Montana Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act of 1987,25 which made Montana the only state
in the nation to generally abrogate employment at will by
prohibiting terminations without good cause, may not have
been such a good result for employee plaintiffs. It, too, was a
reaction by employers and insurers to the expansion of the
common law theory of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which had resulted in some large recoveries by
plaintiffs." Because of limitations on remedies, the average
size of jury awards has been substantially reduced, with the
median award in one survey being zero. 5 The Model
Employment Termination Act (META), promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1991, has not been adopted, or even seriously considered, by
any state to date. Further, employee rights advocates have not
uniformly applauded it. 5'
Employment at will has withstood the efforts by
employment law reformers. While many contract and tort
theories have been recognized since the 1970s, there has been
retrenchment in the last decade or so, and employment at will
is perhaps stronger now than it was twenty years ago. 5 '
Although one could predict in the 1980s and early 1990s that
more states would follow Montana's lead in enacting wrongful
discharge law," the resurgence of employment at will and the
ebbing of contract and tort theories limiting the doctrine
indicates that there will be no more state legislation enacted in
the foreseeable future.259 It cannot be surprising that
253 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 914
(2002).
254 Marc Jarsulic, Protecting Workers From Wrongful

Discharge: Montana's

Experience With Tort and Statutory Regimes, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 105,

107 (1999); Parker, supra note 23, at 371-73.
255 Jarsulic, supra note 254, at
122.
256 See Sprang, supra note 238, at 865; Parker, supra note 23, at 376-79.
257 Summers, supra note 24, at 85 ("[Tlhe trend in the last ten years
has been
toward more employer dominance."); Parker, supra note 23, at 350-51 (discussing the
scrutiny of employment at will during the 1970s and '80s, but concluding that courts
have not developed coherent tort and contract law regarding the doctrine); Kim, supra
note 17, at 680 ("Despite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule has retained its
vitality and, if anything, has been regaining strength in recent years.").
258 Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation
in the
United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, 658 (1991).
259 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of
Trade and
Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 36 (2001);
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employment at will has proven so resilient. For employers,
there is no more sacrosanct principle of law. Employers wish to
operate their businesses as they choose with no regulation by
federal or state government. Employment at will is the
embodiment of no regulation; legislatures do not pass laws to
regulate and courts do not second-guess employers' termination
decisions.2
The tempest over wrongful discharge is not likely to
abate completely in this century, but there is a noticeable shift
toward debate about reforming the law and increasing the
protections regarding other terms and conditions of
employment. One reason for this shift is the intransigence of
the at-will doctrine. Another reason is that workers are less
concerned with termination because job tenure is short,
currently three and a half years on average. 6 ' If employees do
not stay in jobs long, job security and employment at will may
be of less concern than making the workplace a pleasant, or at
least tolerable, environment while they are there. 6
Ultimately, the failed efforts to statutorily abrogate
employment at will hold three broad lessons for those who seek
to reform the law regarding electronic and genetic privacy
invasions, bullying, and other existing and future workplace
problems. First, employers do not like to be regulated, and they
will oppose employment law, particularly legislation, which
provides a concrete target when it is introduced in a

Parker, supra note 23, at 404 ("[Llegislative remedies offer little real hope of success.").
260 One judge
analogized the hands-off approach of courts to at-will
terminations to the courts' no-fault approach to divorces: "Our law chooses not to
involve itself with the unfair and subjective treatment leading to these broken at-will
relationships in a manner which is somewhat analogous to no-fault divorce." Nicholas
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, 850 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Caraway, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).
21, BLS Reports Little Change in Job Tenure Since 1983; Gap Between
Sexes
Narrowing, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 30, 2000 (No. 169), at D1 (reporting Bureau
of Labor Standards survey that found median tenure of workers with their current
employer is 3 years); Henry S. Farber, Trends in Long Term Employment in the
United States 1976-96, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT
LANDSCAPE: AS WE ENTER THE 21' CENTURY, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
52D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 63, 89 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 2000) (the "fraction
of workers who were in long-term employment relationships declined significantly
between 1979 and 1996, with a disproportionate share of the decline occurring since
1993") [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITION].
2 Professor Dau-Schmidt explains: "Just-cause protection is critical only
when the incumbent job is clearly better for the worker than other jobs. A worker
suffers less damage from being terminated from a particular job that, with high
turnover, he probably would have left in a few years anyway." Dau-Schmidt, supra note
259, at 36.
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legislature. Second, employers will ferociously oppose any law
that appears to weaken employment at will." Third, the
Montana experience demonstrates an exception to the
foregoing principles. If the common law has moved in a
direction unfavorable to employers so that employment at will
no longer provides reliable immunity in the courts, then
employers may support legislation if they can fashion laws that
restore them to a more favorable situation."
IV. RESERVATIONS ABOUT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
EMERGING WORKPLACE PROBLEMS

As the noted scholar Clyde Summers once remarked, Congress, in
enacting legislation, does "not move by small steps but rather by
sporadic leaps." Those leaps, some might be tempted to add, have not
always been preceded by a careful look. Assuming we have reached
one of those notable legislative moments in employment ordering,
how far and in which direction Congress might be inclined to vault is
unclear."

As discussed above, a legislative approach is only one of
the methods used to regulate employment in the United
States," and only one of the approaches to guaranteeing
individual employment rights. Many employee rights advocates
have become perhaps too enamored of federal or state
legislation as the best means of regulating employers' conduct
and protecting employees' rights."' As the analysis in this
2&1I am not revealing a great mystery here. Employee rights advocates
who
are proposing reforms that can be made without gutting employment at will, and who
can restrain themselves from railing against it, know that the best chance for their

proposed law is to walk gingerly around employment at will. See, e.g., Yamada, supra
note 16, at 531 (arguing that the proposed status-blind harassment law does not
substantially impinge upon employment at will - certainly not as much as Title VII
does).
2
Professor Alan Krueger has examined the Montana experience and nine
other states in which just cause legislation was introduced in the legislature, only to
fail. Krueger, supra note 258. Professor Krueger concludes that legislation to abrogate
employment at will is more likely to be introduced when courts have significantly
eroded employment at will through common law theories. Id. at 658; Parker, supra
note 23, at 373.
2 Kohler, supra note 32, at 119 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, A Summary
Evaluationof the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 405, 405 (1958)).
26 See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying
text.
267 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 698 (noting
the current preference for
legislative regulation); Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 32 n.128 ("In part, the preference
for Title VII [rather than torts to address harassment claims) may reflect a scholarly
bias in favor of federal law."); Kim, supra note 20, at 1500-01 (discussing the desire of
advocates of genetic discrimination legislation to claim the moral authority of the civil
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section shows, legislation is not the best approach to regulating
electronic privacy invaders, genetic discriminators, and bullies.
A.

PoliticalLimitations of a Legislative Approach

Employers claim they are besieged by legal regulations
and potential liability. 68 From their perspective, the vaunted
employment-at-will doctrine is a mere shadow of its former
self, so riddled with exceptions that it cannot be relied upon
any longer.69 Although this may sound laughable to students of
the law who recognize that the common law incursions of the
1970s and 1980s have receded, employers in their operations
may take note of the potential for liability and act as though
the legal realm outside employment at will is larger than it
actually is.270 Moreover, the changing character of the economy
exacerbates this view. If U.S. businesses are to remain
competitive in a market of global competition,27 ' they cannot be
shackled with more and more employment regulatory laws that
impose increasing costs.272 Thus, legislation may become even
more difficult to enact in the era of globalization.273
rights movement); cf. Parker, supra note 23, at 370 (labeling wrongful discharge
legislation "the deus ex machina of employment law").
268 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note
33.
269 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of
a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 687 (2000) ("[Tjhe lessons of the current trends in the
wrongful discharge area . . . suggest that employers soon will no longer be able to
terminate employees for no cause or bad cause. The future of employment-at-will, then,
is that it has no future."). But see Dowling, supra note 225, at 13-14 ("U.S. employment
lawyers say that America's employment at will has eroded away, but theirs is a
historical, not an international perspective. By comparison to other countries,
employment at will is alive and well in the U.S ..... "); Estlund, supra note 223, at
1669 (arguing that the employment-at-will doctrine "undermines and distorts the
operation of [wrongful discharge] laws"); id. at 1688 ("The argument that wrongful
discharge law has eviscerated employment at will is simply overstated.").
270 Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights and
Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 16-17 (2002) (describing view of employment
law in which the "shadow of the law" is larger than the law).
271 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 697-98, 702 (discussing this
issue as
one of the limitations of the legislative-regulation approach to legally protecting
workers).
272 See Survey of Manufacturers Assesses Costs of Complying With Workplace
Regulations,DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 24, 2002 (No. 16), at Al (detailing survey by
George Mason University's Mercatus Center regarding costs of compliance with
workplace laws).
273 See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment
Law:
Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L. J. 29, 34 (2001) ("More frequently
will the argument be heard and accepted that a country cannot afford extravagant
employment-law protections when other countries are only providing efficient
protections."); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 697.
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From federal and state legislators' perspective,
employment legislation is a political lightning rod. 74 Although a
considerable number of federal employment statutes were
passed from 1963 to 1993,7' major federal legislation has not

been passed in the decade since. Of the proposed statutes on
electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination, the only ones
that have been enacted are genetic discrimination statutes at
the state level. The electronic monitoring bills are the most
revealing example of how hard it is to enact employment law.
The PCWA and NEMA would have imposed modest regulations
on electronic monitoring of employees, 76 but they were bottled
up in congressional committees by business groups. The
California electronic monitoring notice bill was passed three
consecutive years by the legislature and vetoed by the
Democratic governor each time."' If such a meager limitation
on monitoring cannot become law in California with a
Democratic governor, it is hard to imagine where such a law
could be enacted. In sum, taken together, the dearth of federal
legislation in the past decade, the aggressiveness of the
employer's lobby, and the California experience with electronic
monitoring, illustrate that legislative responses to new
workplace issues face substantial political hurdles.
B.

Limitations of Minimum Rights Legislation

The proposed statutes also demonstrate the difficulty of
addressing general status-blind harassment and invasions of
privacy through legislation. The method does not fit well with
the protections that employees need. The general harassment
law is a minimum rights law that prohibits a type of
employment action, as do the FLSA, the FMLA, the EPPA, and
the WARN Act. The problem is that the law does not prohibit
something with sufficient specificity to be effective.
Harassment or bullying describes many acts and many
degrees of abuse. The anti-bullying law proposed by Professor
171 See Hill Watchers Foresee Little Activity on the
Labor and Employment
Law Front, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 9, 2001 (No. 153) (quoting Deron Zeppelin,
director of government affairs for the Society for Human Resource Management, as
saying, 'Most members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote on
[employment] issues, period.").
275 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
276See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.

27 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying
text.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 1

Yamada and The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute is
too vague to be useful - either in giving notice of prohibited
conduct and deterring it, or in giving courts a standard for
imposing liability. 8 To take sexual (and other Title VII)
harassment theory and sever the "because of. . . " element is to
create a minimum terms statute with a vague standard: Do not
be abusive or mean to employees. Minimum terms statutes,
other than anti-discrimination statutes, work well when they
state specific actions that employers are required to take (pay a
minimum wage and overtime) or are prohibited from taking
(requesting or requiring a polygraph examination, except under
certain circumstances). However, when the laws concern a
general type of conduct, they work poorly.
The electronic monitoring bills also are minimum rights
laws, but they suffer from just the opposite problem of the antibullying law. They are specific enough to be implemented but
provide little protection for expectations of privacy. If Congress
enacted a law that prohibited electronic monitoring, that would
be a substantial privacy protection law. Congress did pass a
similar law in another context in1988 - the EPPA, which
essentially prohibited employers from using polygraph
examinations."9 However, because of the well-accepted
interests of employers, neither Congress nor any state
legislature will seriously consider a bill that prohibits
electronic monitoring; indeed, there is no need to waste time
considering such a law when even notice laws cannot be
enacted.' Consequently, the bills are restricted to requiring
notice, and they provide little protection of reasonable privacy
interests of employees."1 In this respect, the PCWA and NEMA

278 See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implicationsof
the Changing Workplace For Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 611
(2001) (describing Yamada's proposal as having a standard that is too vague to apply,
and characterizing it as "providing broad new conceptions of workplace justice rather
than detailed blueprints for legal reform"). It is no answer that it prohibits harassment
much as Title VII prohibits sex and other status-based harassment. Antidiscrimination law focuses on the motivation or cause of the adverse employment
action. Title VII does not prohibit firing, hiring, or harassing unless it is because of a
protected characteristic. In the status-blind harassment proposal, there is no becauseof requirement. The difference renders the standard in the anti-bullying law too vague
to be used.
279 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09
(2000).
m Frayer, supra note 19, at 873-74 (arguing that a bill that protects privacy
interests should not be considered now in view of failure of notice bills).
1 See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 19, at 300; Wilborn, supra note 19, at 851-52;
Frayer, supra note 19, at 869.
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resemble other minimum rights laws that give employees
little. 2
There is no quick fix for this flaw, making it all the
more fatal. It would be difficult to draft a statute that falls
substantively between the notice laws and a prohibition on
monitoring-one that balances the interests of employers in
monitoring and the privacy interests of employees." Balancing
tests are performed in specific factual contexts, and a statute
stating that specified interests must be balanced would not
provide the certainty or predictability that are the principal
objectives of legislation. In short, case law still would develop
the practically useful principles.
The genetic discrimination statutes enacted by states
and introduced as bills in Congress fit more neatly within the
types of legislation that have been enacted in the past. Most
take the form of anti-discrimination laws by prohibiting
adverse actions because of a protected characteristic.' The
laws also resemble minimum rights laws in that they impose
limitations on employers' requiring or requesting that
2
employees submit to genetic testing. " To the extent that the
genetic discrimination laws are minimum rights laws, most
legislatures are not willing to prohibit the testing altogether
because there are some good reasons why some employers for
some jobs under some conditions might need to require genetic
testing.' By mixing a minimum rights approach with an antidiscrimination approach, the laws manage to provide more
protection than most minimum rights statutes. The resort to
the anti-discrimination paradigm is troubling, however, for
other reasons.
C.

ConcernsAbout Anti-discriminationLaw

The concerns in this section have little if any
implication for electronic monitoring laws, but they are
relevant to status-neutral harassment laws and genetic
282 Summers, supra note 24, at 84-85 (stating that "[1labor legislation in the
United States is often half-hearted," and giving as examples several minimum rights
laws); Stone, supra note 245, at 636-38 (discussing problems with "individual
rights/minimum terms model of labor relations").
Wilborn, supra note 19, at 852-53, 876.
2"4 Feldman & Katz, supra note 20, at 410-16 (surveying state laws).
285 Id.
21 Id. at 397.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 1

discrimination laws. The proposed status-blind harassment law
is modeled on the harassment law that developed under the
federal employment anti-discrimination laws. 7 Despite the
success of past anti-discrimination laws, and probably because
of that success, they are the subject of frequent criticisms.
Because of the importance of these laws to our society, we
should be very cautious about using the anti-discrimination
model for addressing emerging workplace problems. Deploying
the method too often dilutes its potency. Instead, the method
should be reserved for select instances of compelling public
policy to protect discrete groups that historically have been
discriminated against." By indiscriminately employing the
model, the proposed status-blind harassment law and the
proposed and enacted genetic discrimination laws could
weaken the employment anti-discrimination laws, although
that is by no means the intent of their proponents.289
The employment anti-discrimination statutes have been
the most significant and most effective statutory labor laws
since the NLRA. Title VII, in particular, has generated a
monumental shift in employment law and society.' Antidiscrimination law significantly impinges upon employment at
will, carving out a number of bad reasons, or "cause[s] morally
wrong,"9 ' for which employers cannot take adverse employment

27

See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying
text.

288See, e.g, Kim, supra note 20, at 1522-24
(recognizing that a "history of

systematic discrimination," one of the most generally accepted reasons for existing
anti-discrimination law, does not apply to genetic discrimination).
The importance of the laws and the public policy on which they are
founded has not been more eloquently articulated than this:
The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused with a public aura for
reasons that are well known . . .Congress has responded to ... pernicious
misconceptions and ignoble hatreds with humanitarian laws formulated to
wipe out the iniquity of discrimination in employment, not merely to
recompense the individuals so harmed but principally to deter future
violations.

The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress enacted consequently
resonate with a forceful public policy vilifying discrimination.
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted
andjudgment vacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
289 Professor Yamada specifically rejects
Professor Hager's arguments
regarding sexual harassment law. See infra note 303. Yamada argues that "the
enactment of a status-blind hostile work environment law could specially benefit those
who are targets of status-based harassment as well." Yamada, supranote 16, at 529.
290 Cf. Kim, supra note 20, at 1524-25
(discussing early successes of Title VII"effectuated a change in norms"- but recognizing that it has less impact now).
291 See, e.g., Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884).
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actions. Indeed, today the federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes and the case law developed under them stand as the
9
only significant counterweight to employment at will. ' Overall,
employment anti-discrimination law has drastically changed
workplaces, employment law, and society in the United States.
Notwithstanding the change wrought by the antidiscrimination laws, it is a precarious success. The biggest
target.2 93
success story is also the biggest and most attractive
There is significant debate, beginning in 1964 when Title VII
was enacted and continuing to this day, about the animating
theory of the employment anti-discrimination laws. One theory,
and the one most often articulated, is the formal equality or
status-neutral theory, which posits that the purpose of the laws
is to eliminate race, color, sex, etc., from employment
decisions.2 ' The other theory, the antisubordination or
"protected-class" theory, holds that in order to achieve equal
opportunity in employment, the anti-discrimination laws must
eliminate barriers erected to impede groups that historically
have been discriminated against. 5
Under the protected-class theory, the heart of protection
encompasses groups of people who have historically been
denied employment opportunities and otherwise discriminated
against. Under the formal equality theory, no group, regardless
of historical discrimination, is accorded different treatment.
Courts have articulated both theories.' Although the rhetoric
One court recognized this when it stated that "'discrimination is much
policy in Ohio, it is clearly in and of itself an exception to any at-will
public
than
more
employment agreement.'" Woods v. Phoenix Society of Cuyahoga County, No. CV370763, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 2100, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (quoting White v. Fed.
Reserve Bank, 660 N.E.2d 493 (1995)).
293 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 33; OLSON, supra note 33.
294 Schwartz, supra note 196, at 1775-76; David S. Schwartz, The Case of the
Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination,Affirmative Action,
and Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 657 [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case of the
Vanishing Protected Class]. This theory is closely aligned with, if not synonymous with,
the perpetrator perspective on discrimination. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
295 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973);
Schwartz, supra note 196, at 1776 (discussing the antisubordination or protected-class
theory of the anti-discrimination laws); Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected
Class, supra note 294. This theory is closely aligned with, if not synonymous with, the
victim perspective on discrimination. See Freeman, supra note 294, at 1052-57.
296 Case law recognizing the legality of affirmative action under Title VII is
the most dramatic example of the protected-class theory. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). A recent case exemplifying the status-neutral theory is an age discrimination
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of the formal equality theory predominates in the cases, the
protected-class theory lives on in both rhetoric and substantive
discrimination law. The most prominent examples of antidiscrimination case law supported by one theory but
antithetical to the other are the disparate impact theory of
discrimination and affirmative action, which both draw from
the protected-class theory.
Other examples exist in distinctions courts make in
disparate treatment cases. For example, some courts have
stated that for white plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
under the McDonnell Douglas proof structure, they must
produce more evidence of discriminatory motive than AfricanAmerican plaintiffs." Courts in some cases have held that for
male plaintiffs to establish a disparate impact claim, they must
produce evidence of discrimination that female plaintiffs are
not required to produce." Many proponents of the formal
equality theory are hostile to the protected-group theory,
arguing that it uses anti-discrimination law to discriminate.3 "
There are two fundamental problems with the statusblind harassment law proposal: it has a dangerous theoretical
underpinning, and it ventures into a most controversial subject
area. As to the first point, status-blind harassment law is
grounded on arguments made by proponents of the formal
equality theory of employment anti-discrimination law, or
perhaps more pointedly, opponents of the protected-class
theory These arguments all rest on the idea that workplace
abuse causes a dignitary harm for men as well as women, and
the law must protect both equally."° This idea poses a threat to
case in which the court of appeals permitted an age discrimination claim by younger
plaintiffs who claimed that the employer discriminated against them on the basis of
age in favor of older employees. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct 1786 (2003).
297 Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class, supra note 294, at
662-63, 671-75.
298 See, e.g., Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
M See, e.g., Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir.
1986). See generally Donald T. Kramer, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or
National Origin DiscriminationViolative of Federal Constitution or Statutes - Private
Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 1, §2b (1998); see also Timothy K. Giordano,
Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call for
Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate Is Equal,
49 EMORY L.J. 993 (2000).
* Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class, supra note 294, at
668-70.
...Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII
Hostile
Environment LiabilityShould Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 383 (1998).

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

2003]

143

laws because it labels all
the anti-discrimination
discrimination based on a protected characteristic as wrongful
and seeks to equally apply the laws in the same way to all
races, sexes and religions, regardless of historical
discrimination. For example, no different principles of Title VII
anti-discrimination law can apply to whites than AfricanAmericans; plaintiff-friendly presumptions that make sense
when applied to African-Americans because of the history of
employment discrimination must be applied to whites as well. 2
Professor Yamada is aware of this danger nested in his
proposal, but awareness is no cure."
This danger is one of the reasons that Professor Rosa
Ehrenreich proposed keeping the focus of Title VII on the
and
harassment
sexual
of
nature
discriminatory
supplementing it with a modified tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to address the dignitary harms. 4 I do not
suggest that opponents of the protected-class theory would
support status-blind harassment law; instead, they would
argue that the only legitimate theory of discrimination, applied
to harassment law, should lead to the untenable and infeasible
result of law that prohibits employers from being mean or
tolerating meanness in the workplace - the general civility
code argument, already rejected.
A second danger embedded in the status-blind
harassment proposal is that it takes as its model the most
controversial theory of anti-discrimination law - harassment."5
The efforts of Professor Catherine McKinnon and others to
establish the theory of sexual harassment under Title VII have
been well documented. ' Not only could it be argued at the
founding of the theory that it should have been left to tort
law, 3 ' but the argument has been made since the sexual

harassment theory received the imprimatur of the Supreme

302 See, e.g., Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1993); see

generally Kramer, supra note 299, §2b; Giordano, supra note 299.
303 Yamada, supra note 16, at 531 ("To say that the distinction between
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory harassment is morally untenable is to take a fair
point - that harassment of any kind is wrong - too far.").
304 Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 63.
'05 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARV. L. REV. 445, 450 (1997); Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 7-8; Kohler, supra note
32, at 116.
306 See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 32-36.
307

Id.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 1

Court."8 As difficult as it is to explain the theoretical
underpinnings of sexual harassment law,"n it does not help to
create a status-neutral version.
While adding status-neutral harassment law would not
result in the repeal of federal anti-discrimination laws, it
unwittingly narrows
the theoretical
basis of antidiscrimination law and extends one of the most vulnerable
theories - harassment. Employment anti-discrimination law
can be weakened in many ways without the statutes actually
being repealed." ' Status-neutral theory and prohibition of
ambiguous conduct would make the law seem overly intrusive
in the workplace and perhaps make it look frivolous or
ridiculous. Opponents would thus argue that the law imposed a
general civility code and sanitized the workplace, not only
attacking the status-neutral law in particular, but also by
implication all anti-discrimination employment laws, thus
potentially weakening the entire field.
The genetic discrimination laws are not pure antidiscrimination laws. In the division between minimum rights
statutes and anti-discrimination statutes discussed above, they
should be classified in part as minimum rights laws, like the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act."' For example, to the
extent that the laws prohibit employers from requiring or
requesting that employees submit to genetic testing, they are
like the EPPA, a minimum rights statute. Most, however, are
not just minimum rights laws because most of the statutes do
not simply prohibit genetic testing. To the extent that they
prohibit adverse employment actions based on information
about genetic conditions, they are more like anti-discrimination
laws."2 There is nothing wrong with the laws being a cross
308Hager, supra note 301; Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex
Discrimination:A Defective Paradigm,8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (1990).
309See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 305, at 446; Ehrenreich,
supra note 23, at
7-15.
310 Consider, for example, the progressive narrowing of the disparate
impact
theory of discrimination under Title VII, culminating in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). At least some of that narrowing subsequently was
reversed with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) and scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
311 See Kim, supra note 20, passim (arguing that genetic discrimination
does
not fit the anti-discrimination paradigm and is better addressed through privacy law).
312 At first blush, one could say they are minimum
rights laws just like the
EPPA, which also prohibits adverse employment actions on the basis of information
obtained from polygraphs. Unlike the information obtained by polygraph tests,
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between minimum rights laws and anti-discrimination laws.
However, their anti-discrimination aspects are troublesome.
Particularly troubling are their departure from prior antidiscrimination law in protecting a discrete, historically
discriminated-against group; their kinship with the Americans
with Disabilities Act; and their potential redundancy.3 "3
First, unlike other anti-discrimination laws, the genetic
discrimination laws do not grow from a history of
discrimination against a particular group."4 Instead, they are
more like the proposed electronic monitoring laws-a reaction to
advances in science and technology. The "genetically
defective""' have now sped past other candidate groups, such as
homosexuals and parents, to be protected by state employment
anti-discrimination laws,"' and there is a chance that Congress
will pass a genetic discrimination law before it passes a sexual
orientation anti-discrimination law. 17 There is no requirement
that a group of people who face discrimination in employment
must line up and wait their turn for protective legislation,
never breaking in line. Still, the history of employment antidiscrimination law in this nation reveals long periods of
incubation for civil rights laws in which the record of historical
discrimination is publicized, political alliances are forged, and
however, the information obtained by genetic testing is information about a person's
inherent characteristics.
.,.Professor Kim discusses some of these reasons and others for her rejection
of the anti-discrimination model for genetic discrimination. She also argues that some
of the practical difficulties with anti-discrimination law, such as the proof structures
and doctrines that have made discrimination cases difficult to win and costly to
litigate, would be incorporated into genetic discrimination law. See Kim, supra note 20,
at 1524-28.
314 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 20, at 1518-20; cf Peggie R. Smith, ParentalStatus Employment Discrimination:A Wrong in Need of a Right, 35 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 569, 604-07 (2002).
311 "We're all mutants . . . everybody is genetically defective." Brian M. Holt,
Comment, Genetically Defective: The Judicial Interpretation of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Fails to Protect Against Genetic Discriminationin the Workplace, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 457 (2002) (quoting Dr. Michael Kaback); Kim, supra note 20,
at 1520 ("Even conceptualizing the relevant disadvantaged "group" raises some
difficulties, given that each individual's genetic material contains some anomalies that
predispose to disease.").
",;There are about 31 states that have passed genetic discrimination laws.
See NHGRI Website, supra note 145. Only 11 states have sexual orientation
discrimination laws. Michael Delikat, Discrimination Law Update, in LITIGATING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 2002, at 134 (Practicing Law Institute Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series, No. HO-OOFC, 2002).
317Regarding attempts since 1994 to pass the Employment Nondiscrimination
Act (ENDA) concerning sexual orientation, see supra note 15. Congress already has
considered a genetic discrimination bill, although it has not passed. See supra notes
171-76 and accompanying text.
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eventually sufficient public policy support and political clout
coalesce to provoke passage of the law."' Unless one views the
people protected by genetic discrimination laws as disabled
individuals, who are protected by the ADA, then this
incubation has not happened. Rather, the frightening prospect
that science and technology could penetrate deep within our
zone of privacy - into our genetic composition - has resulted in
the passage at the state level and consideration at the federal
level of new anti-discrimination law.
The more deliberative and gradual process behind other
anti-discrimination laws served two important purposes. First,
it showed that the problems at issue were pervasive and that
existing law was inadequate. It is not yet so clear that the
problem of genetic discrimination is pervasive enough and that
existing law is inadequate to address the problem." ' One can
think of other groups of people who are discriminated against
in employment, including perhaps parents320 and the physically
unattractive.32 ' However, the existence of such employment
discrimination will not prompt anti-discrimination law in the
foreseeable future. Second, the slower process behind past antidiscrimination legislation allowed time for political consensus
to develop to give the laws the imprimatur of actual public
policy, which is currently lacking within the context of genetic
discrimination. Although problems of discrimination may exist,
it does not necessarily follow that they should be addressed
through federal employment anti-discrimination legislation. 22

318 Cf. Smith, supra note 314, at 601-12 (discussing factors that determine

which classes become protected under law, including immutable characteristics,
history of discrimination, job-relatedness of the characteristics, and political power).
319 See sources cited supra note 36 (arguing that existing law addresses the
problem to the extent that there is an actual, as opposed to theoretical, problem).
320 Federal legislation has been
proposed to prohibit employment
discrimination against parents, and former President Clinton issued an executive order
on the issue. See generally Smith, supra note 314, at 587 (discussing the Ending
Discrimination Against Parents Act, S. 1907, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) and
Executive Order No. 13,152), 65 Fed. Reg. 26115 (May 4, 2000).
321 See Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters:
A Proposal to Prohibit
Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195 (2000); Jennifer
Fowler-Hermes, The Beauty and the Beast in the Workplace: Appearance-Based
DiscriminationClaims Under EEO Laws, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2001, at 32. The District of
Columbia does prohibit employment discrimination based on "personal appearance."
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1402.11(a).
322 See Kim, supra note 20 (arguing that the anti-discrimination model
is
inappropriate for addressing genetic privacy issues); Smith, supra note 314 (arguing
that anti-discrimination law is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing employment
discrimination against parents).
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The heavy artillery of employment anti-discrimination law
should be used sparingly because it is also the biggest target
for opponents of workplace regulation. It is not clear that it was
or is needed to combat genetic discrimination in employment.
Another cause for concern with genetic discrimination
laws is their relationship with the ADA."3 The class of
protected persons under genetic discrimination laws resembles
the class protected by the ADA; indeed, the EEOC maintains
that genetic conditions are covered by the ADA. The ADA has
been a controversial law that has generated a surprisingly low
number of plaintiffs' victories in the courts.324 This occurrence
has even been described as a "backlash" against the ADA.32' The
open definition of disability has led to many cases in which the
plaintiff presented a laughable claim of an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. Such cases have
fueled media depictions of an employment law that permits
absurd claims.32 Even some scholars have been critical of the
ADA.327 Regardless of how one regards the ADA, it has had a
tumultuous run since its passage. To the extent genetic
discrimination laws are perceived to be similar to the ADA,
that perception does not presage a good future.
Finally, and more significant, is the issue of
redundancy. The EEOC takes the position that the ADA covers
most of the cases that would be covered by a genetic
discrimination law, and, in fact, it has filed suit in a case and
settled it. 2' Redundancy in employment law is undesirable. It
yields uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the state of

See generally Kim, supra note 20, at 1527-32.
See generally Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Foreword-BacklashAgainst the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications
for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7-8 (2000).
325 Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
326 Krieger, supra note 324, at 9-10; Cary LaCheen, Achy
Breaky Pelvis,
Lumber Lung and Juggler'sDespair: The Portrayalof the Americans with Disabilities
Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000). Many of
Gerald Skoning's ten "wackiest" employment cases in his annual survey in the
National Law Journal have been ADA cases. See, e.g., Gerald D. Skoning, Workplace
Wackiness Lives On, NA'L L.J., Mar. 25, 2002 at A16.
327 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson,
Discrimination With a
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001).
328 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
3"
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the law and excessive litigation."' Additionally, a new antidiscrimination statute, if it were under the jurisdiction of the
EEOC (and the EEOC has argued for it)"3 ° would spread more
thinly the resources of the already overburdened agency."l
In sum, anti-discrimination employment law is a
powerful tool that has done the heavy lifting of declaring and
implementing important public policy. Rather than basing our
anti-discrimination laws on preventing dignitary harms to
insular groups, we have based them primarily on the equal
opportunity principle. As influential and successful as the
federal employment anti-discrimination laws have been, they
are inviting targets for those who oppose regulation of the
workplace. No parts of employment anti-discrimination law
have been more controversial than harassment law and the
ADA. To protect our anti-discrimination laws, we should enact
new ones with great reluctance and only after we have
examined all options.
D.

Marginalizationof Employment Law

Employment law in the United States is increasingly
recognized as a distinct area of law, so much so that it has
become compartmentalized.3 " This has some positive and
negative ramifications. Broadly, it is good that legally
regulating this important facet of life is viewed as worthwhile.
law has been
side, employment
On the negative
"marginaliz[ed] - lawyers and courts alike have acted as if
employment law were something 'special,' existing outside the
bounds of ordinary contract and tort law."333 Moreover,
employment at will has taken on a substantive life beyond the
rebuttable presumption that it is.3" It occupies so much of the
domain of employment law that courts do not apply standard

32 See Summers,

supra note 35, at 18-19 (predicting that reconciling
overlapping protections would be the most difficult problem in employment law and
stating that "[olne can scarcely imagine an arrangement better designed to hold out
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers,
and clog the legal machinery").
330 EEOC Head Stresses Agency's Need to Handle Genetic Bias
Complaints,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 14, 2002 (No. 31), at A6.
33
Smith, supra note 314, at 610-11.
331 See supra note 14 (discussing the emergence of employment law as a
distinct area of the law).
3 Parker, supra note 23, at 352.
33 Id. at 349-52.
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contract and tort principles in the same way that they do in
other contexts. Writing about wrongful discharge law,
Professor J. Wilson Parker argued that lawyers, judges and
scholars should stop viewing employment law as a "boutique
area of the law" and apply common-law principles to wrongful
discharges."'
The marginalization concern also applies to the
problems of electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and
bullying. Employment law is marginalized, as Parker suggests,
but I would modify the view that he attributes to lawyers,
judges, and scholars. The area of employment law is dominated
by two great pillars: employment at will and statutory
employment law (principally employment anti-discrimination
law). Thus, absent statutory employment law, courts are not
likely to apply common law contract and tort theories and
principles in a normal way.33 An explanation for the atrophy of
common law in employment is that courts may be paralyzed by
fear that permitting recovery on a contract or tort theory by an
employee will encroach too much on the employer prerogatives
embodied in employment at will.
An alternative explanation is that courts may take
comfort in the insulation provided by the at-will doctrine; they
do not have to second-guess employers' decisions because
normal contract and tort principles are blunted by employment
at will. 7 A good example of this is Quebedeaux v. Dow
Chemical Co."' In that case, one employee physically attacked
another, and both were discharged pursuant to the company's
no-fighting policy. The plaintiff sued the company under a
vicarious liability theory for the battery committed by the coemployee and sought as elements of damages past and future
lost wages and benefits resulting from the termination. Under
the extended liability principle for intentional torts, as applied
by the lower court, a plaintiff may recover for all damages

335 Id. at 354, 359 ("The same law that governs a consumer purchase
or
personal injury suit should also apply to one's livelihood.").
316 Parker says "[the heart of trepidation rests with a reluctance to interfere
with business judgment-unquestionably a legitimate concern." Id. at 356. Trepidation
aside, judicial administration and docket management may better explain courts'
reliance on employment at will; it is a convenient tool for dismissing cases.
337 See Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, 849-52 (La. Ct. App.
1999)
(Caraway, J., dissenting), rev'd, 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).
38 820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002).
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flowing from the tort, whether foreseeable or not."9 The state
supreme court reversed, however, stating that "victim
compensation, which is one of the primary policies supporting
vicarious liability, must give way to the employment-at-will
doctrine, which furthers broader societal policies, such as
maintaining a free and efficient flow of human resources. " "
Examples of courts' treatments of the torts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of
privacy also demonstrate the skewing of common law principles
by employment at will. Courts generally will not find
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case in which
the plaintiff was terminated because to do so would provide a
theory to circumvent employment at will.' Invasion of privacy
cases also show that employers' interests overwhelm
employees' interests, as courts conclude that employees do not
have reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace, and
even if they do, the invasions are not highly offensive because
of employers' interests in workplace management.4 Thus, the
marginalization of employment law means that the general
common law of torts and contracts provides little recourse to
employees. Instead, their recourse is largely in federal and
state statutory law. In turn, the preeminence of statutes slowly
eviscerates the common law of employment.
But why is this bad, given the preference of many in the
legal profession, including scholars, for legislation? First, the
day is coming, if it has not already come, when meaningful
employment statutes will be difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to pass. As discussed above, in the wrongful termination
context, statutes cannot be enacted until employers become
frustrated with and afraid of the common law." Then, when
the statutes are enacted, they often take away the advantages
that employees had under the common law. As previously
discussed, the past decade has not seen one major federal
39 Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 809 So. 2d 983, 989 (La. Ct. App. 2001),
rev'd, 820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002).
340 Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546. Three justices concurred and stated
different rationales for reversing, and one expressly stated that he did not think the
statement about employment at will was correct. Id. at 547 (Calogero, C.J.,
concurring).
341 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. See also Austin, supra note
200, at 8-12; Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702-03.
342 See supra notes 114-32 and accompanying text. See also Wilborn, supra
note 19, at 844-46; Kesan, supra note 19, at 302-04; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1019-25.
343 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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employment law, despite the significance of emerging issues.
Even the vapid electronic monitoring notification bills have not
been enacted at the federal level or by California. " Thus, one
result of marginalization is that even when legislatures do pass
statutes, employees get minimum rights statutes that give
them very little. Moreover, it has grown increasingly difficult to
enact even those laws.
Second, cordoning off employment law in a realm of
federal and state legislation permits courts to reject common
law theories with aplomb. Consider, for example, the impact
that passage of an electronic monitoring notification statute,
which would do very little to protect the privacy rights and
dignity of employees, likely would have on the tort of invasion
of privacy. If an employer gave the notification required by the
statute, courts would find no invasion of privacy regardless of
how egregious it was.
Common law tort and contract theories are the stuff of
everyday life. With the recognition that work has become
perhaps the predominant aspect of life in the United States, it
is ironic that we have permitted the law governing that aspect
to become so marginalized and entrusted to a single method of
regulation." However, some scholars have decried a significant
6 Although
role for common law in regulating the workplace.m
the common law cannot and should not be the primary means
of employment regulation,347 it has historically been a piece of
the approach, and it is still needed." We have become so
enamored of legislation that we seem to have forgotten that
there are some matters better left to common law. There are
several strong reasons, recounted above, why one should be
cautious about new legislation. The employment law of the
future will be less responsive to both employer and employee
See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.

345 Cf Bernstein, supra note 39, at 1564. ("As between a new tort and a

vigorous display of group-based activism, I admit a bit of a bias in favor of the new
tort.").
t 46 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 201, at 392 ("Civil tort litigation is not
an ideal
instrument to bring about radical change in the balance of power in the workplace and
may well delay the search for effective methods of enforcing workers' rights.").
37 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 700 ("Given
its limitations . . . it seems
unlikely that adaptation of the common law will ever become the primary means of
addressing employee demands in this country.").
3
See Samuel Issacharoff, Contractingfor Employment: The Limited Return
of the Common Law, in GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 261, at 499, 534 (describing
the common law's role as a fallback against voids resulting from decline in collective
bargaining and the partial coverage of the anti-discrimination laws).
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needs if it abandons the common law approach and accedes to a
rigid statutory framework.
V. REINVIGORATING THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE
In the 1970s and 1980s courts and scholars actively
worked with the common law to address the issue of wrongful
discharge. Courts recognized the employment tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, the tort or contract
theory (depending on the state) of breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and various other common law
theories of recovery. 9 In those regards, the California and
Michigan courts were particularly active and creative, and the
Montana courts drove employers to support wrongful discharge
legislation.3" It is time to reinvigorate the common law in the
context of employment to address workplace privacy and
harassment issues. New tort theories do not appear to be
needed,35' but intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
and invasion of privacy must be re-evaluated and redefined
within the workplace context.5 2
A.

Retrofitting Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Substantive

To adjust IIED to address general harassment in the
workplace, courts must lower the bar of "outrageous" conduct
in the employment setting. Courts have recognized the tension
between the wide berth given to management prerogative

319See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
310See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
351It is tempting to recommend a new tort, which I guess I would call

workplace abuse, as Professor Blades did in 1967 with abusive discharge. See supra
note 238. I resist that temptation for several reasons. First, when Professor Blades
proposed the new tort, there was no tort theory that addressed wrongful discharge.
Second, Professor Bernstein has discussed the difficulties of successfully creating a new
tort. Bernstein, supra note 39. Why face the substantial likelihood that a new tort will
fail when there are existing torts that can be modified to do the job? Third, to create a
new employment-specific tort further compartmentalizes employment law, and as I
have explained above, I think that result is undesirable.
352Going against the grain of favoring new employment legislation, several
scholars have recommended common law approaches to workplace issues. Kesan, supra
note 19, at 322-32 (proposing a contract solution to electronic privacy issues);
Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 44-53 (proposing that an adjusted intentional infliction
theory supplement sexual harassment law); Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1019-25
(suggesting that an adjusted tort theory of invasion of privacy can effectively address
genetic intrusions).
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under employment at will and the competing idea that
workplace environments are a setting in which severe
emotional distress is particularly likely to occur. There are
several facets of the employment setting that make it a
breeding ground for severe emotional distress: a hierarchical
organization with authority vested in supervisors; the everpresent threat of discipline or termination and consequent peril
of loss of livelihood; a captive audience, in that victims of
harassment may not leave work simply because they are
distraught; and almost constant contact with and exposure to
the same people.' Because employment in this nation is so
closely identified with one's value and identity in society, 3" and
because so many needs, such as health insurance and
retirement plans, are tied to employment, employees place the
well-being of themselves and their families at risk when they
go to work.
Courts have struck the balance lopsidedly, resolving the
vast majority of the cases in favor of management prerogative
rather than the workplace distress factors. In large part, then,
it is the threat to employment at will posed by IIED that has
caused courts to keep the bar so high. It is one thing, however,
for courts to say that not every termination gives rise to an
IIED claim, and another to say that no case in which
harassment ends in termination or constructive discharge can
give rise to an IIED claim. Because employees have so much at
risk in their jobs and are subject to so many pressures,
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich recommends that the workplace be
considered "an inherently aggravating factor" in IIED claims.3"
Her suggestion, thus, is for courts to restrike the balance on
IIED in the workplace, giving greater weight to the
characteristics of the workplace that make it more stressful
than other settings, and less weight to the need of employers to
manage the workplace through some level of mental distress.
While the employment-at-will concerns that courts have
about IIED in the workplace will render most courts reluctant
to articulate an "inherently aggravating factor" standard,
Ehrenreich has indicated the direction in which courts should
move and provided the supporting rationale. Indeed, a
straightforward application of tort law principles to
3,5See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 23,
at 45-52.
'5

Id. at 49. See also supra note 37.

35 Ehrenreich, supra note 23,
at 49.
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employment would suggest that courts should lower the
threshold of outrageous conduct in the workplace. Early cases
applied lower standards for outrageous conduct, permitting
recovery for insults in cases involving customers interacting
with public utilities and common carriers,3 6 and this was later
expanded to innkeepers.
Many of the same reasons for recognizing a special
relationship between the foregoing entities and their customers
also apply to employers and employees. 57 Thus, regardless of
whether courts are willing to expressly state that employment
is an "inherently aggravating factor," consistent with
established tort principles, courts can lower the standards for
the elements of IIED in the workplace. Moreover, although this
Article does not advocate for a general harassment statute,
courts could fashion a more useful and appropriate standard
for outrageous workplace conduct by using protected-class
harassment cases to inform the types of conduct that might be
considered outrageous. Thus, courts could look for guidance to
cases of conduct found to be severe or pervasive enough to
constitute sexual, racial, religious, national origin, age, or
disability harassment.
B.

Retrofitting Invasion of Privacy:Substantive

Invasion of privacy (principally intrusion on seclusion)
is a flexible theory that can address electronic monitoring and
genetic invasions.' Regarding genetic discrimination, tort
theory could augment the coverage already provided by the
state genetic
Act and
with Disabilities
Americans
discrimination laws. For electronic monitoring, invasion of
privacy should be adjusted to play a central role in light of the
failure of the notice bills to be enacted, and their inadequacy to
provide meaningful protection even if enacted.
The most pressing need is for courts to recognize that
employees can have privacy expectations in the workplace by
prohibiting employers from destroying privacy expectations

35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 115, § 48; DOBBS, supra note 117, §

303.
'5' See, e.g., Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 660-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1981),
rev. denied, 644 P.2d 1128 (Or. 1982) (permitting recovery for reckless infliction of
emotional distress because employer-employee is a "special relationship" involving an
imbalance of power).
35 See Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1004.
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through policies and statements. Until that change occurs,
unrealistic contract notions that the employer and employee
have agreed upon little or no expectation of privacy will
continue to undermine the tort theory.35 In employment,
negotiation and agreement on privacy rarely occurs, and tort
law should recognize a duty of employers to respect employees'
reasonable expectations of privacy and not permit employers to
disclaim it. Although it may take some work by courts and
perhaps trumping of contract law by tort law, there are general
tort principles that courts could apply to halt employer
eviscerations of employee privacy expectations. For example,
duress or coercion may render consent ineffective."n An
alternative or additional ground for rendering consent an
ineffective defense could be that the invasion exceeded the
scope of the consent.
If a court chooses to emphasize the contract aspects of
the privacy tort, there are other contract rationales under
which courts could hold unenforceable employees' agreements
to waive privacy rights. For example, a waiver may be
unenforceable as violating public policy when there is a
significant disparity of bargaining power between the parties."'
Another tenet requires that waivers be knowing and
voluntary. 31 On the other side of the Catch-22 of intrusion upon
seclusion, if an employee refuses to permit the intrusion, courts
can find that attempts to intrude satisfy the intrusion
requirement based upon the power imbalance and the effect on
the employee of the attempted intrusion.'
C.

RetrofittingBoth IntentionalInfliction of Emotional
Distressand Invasion of Privacy: Procedural

There are two important procedural changes that
should be made to the applicable torts. First, for both IIED and
invasion of privacy, the most necessary adjustment is for courts

351
3W
361

Spencer, supra note 56, at 870.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 115, § 892B(3).
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 115, § 892A(4).

362 See, e.g., Doe v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d
248, 253 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993), afl'd as modified, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995)
3

Estlund, supra note 270, at 23-27.

See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So.2d 705, 709
(Ala. 1983) (holding that acquisition of information from a plaintiff is not a requisite
element of intrusion upon solitude).
36
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to refrain from granting so many summary judgments 3" and to
let close cases proceed to trial. Juries have sufficient sympathy
for employees who are harassed and subjected to invasions of
privacy." Consider, for example, the Kentucky case, Stringer v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 67 in which four Wal-Mart clerks were
discharged for eating candy and nuts from damaged packages.
Wal-Mart claimed the employees had violated a store pilferage
policy, but the employees claimed they were following an
unwritten store policy whereby such food was left in the
employee lounges for consumption. The plaintiffs sued for
IIED, invasion of privacy and slander.:" A jury awarded each
plaintiff five million dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages.'
The call for fewer summary judgments in this context is
not merely an ends-oriented approach. It is by no means clear
that the two elements on which IIED and invasion of privacy
claims are routinely dismissed on summary judgment outrageous conduct and expectation of privacy, respectively should be decided by courts as a matter of law. Because both
outrageous conduct and reasonable expectation of privacy
invoke societal standards, these questions, like breach in
negligence cases, are appropriate for jury resolution, and only
rarely should be decided by courts.
Additionally, diverting more employment cases to
alternative dispute resolution methods could be a partial
panacea for the courts' tendency to dismiss employment tort
cases on summary judgment. It is possible that arbitrators and
36 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 28, at 1726-33. Professor Beiner makes this
argument regarding sexual harassment cases. See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury
Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually
Harassing,75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 791-95 (2002).
:6 See Gergen, supra note 28, at 1736 (noting that juries are correctly
perceived to be biased against employers in tort cases); Schmidt v. Ameritech Ill., 768
N.E. 2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (overturning award of $5 million in punitive damages to
employee in invasion of privacy claim where employer examined home telephone
records of employee). Cf Beiner, supra note 365, 842-46.
367 No. 95-CI-00228 (Ky. Cir. Ct., judgment entered Jan. 19, 1999), reported
in, Wal-Mart Ordered to Pay $20 Million to FourStore Clerks Fired for Eating Candy,
14 Individual Employment Rights (BNA), Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14), at 1.
See also Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., No. 98-815 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Jan. 2, 2002),
reportedin South Dakota Jury Awards $525,000 to Man Who Claims Employer Opened
PersonalMail, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 5, 2002 (No. 24), at A6.
369 Ex-Wal-Mart Staff Awarded $20 Million in Kentucky Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 1999, at A10; Wal-Mart Ordered to Pay $20 Million to Four Store Clerks Fired
for Eating Candy, 14 Individual Employment Rights (BNA), Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14), at
1.
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mediators may be more receptive than judges to claims of
workplace abuse. 30
D.

Hope for Common Law Change and the Obstacle of
Rigid Courts

Is there any hope that courts will make any of the above
substantive and procedural changes in their approaches to the
tort theories? 7' Many object that the courts are too rigid to
adjust the common law torts to address these problems. 72
Several responses are in order. First, the difficulty of effecting
change is no excuse to stop advocating for change. All that is
needed is time and pressure. 7 ' The evolution of the common
law is often slow, but it does evolve to address new challenges
and reflect society's evolving values.373 General recognition in
tort of recovery for emotional distress injuries has taken place
largely within the last forty years, and mostly within the past
thirty.7 Because of the limitations of legislation and the value
of a common law approach to these problems, it is no answer to
dismiss the common law because of the difficulty and pace. As
with many things in life, the fastest and seemingly easiest
approach is not necessarily the best.

370 See, e.g., Panel Orders Dow Chemical to Reinstate a Dozen Workers
Fired
for E-Mail Abuse, supra note 66 (arbitration panel ordered reinstatement of 12
employees because of disparate treatment under e-mail policy); Oklahoma Fixture Co.
and Carpenters, Local 943, 01-02 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH),
3912 (July 7, 2001)
(arbitrator awarded reinstatement to employee fired for insubordination because
employee was provoked by supervisor's bullying) (citing Yamada, supra note 16). An
arbitrator awarded a terminated employee $200,000 for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but the district court vacated the award in Hughes Training, Inc. v.
Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001). The arbitration agreement established a broader
standard of review-the judicial standard of review-than normally applies to arbitral
awards.
371 See Wilborn, supra note 19, at 854 (a common law approach to
privacy
issues would require "considerable judicial activism," and courts do not appear willing
to engage in such); Kesan, supra note 19, at 322 (suggesting that courts may step in to
limit employer monitoring, but it is unlikely based on past record).
372 See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 55-56 (addressing the rigid
courts
objection).
373 Id.
314 See THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures
1994).
375 Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 55-56; Cf Bernstein, supra note
39, at 1565
("The measured, respectful movement of a new tort will always appear feeble to
activists . . ").
376 See generally Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136
(1992). Cf Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998).
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A second reason to have hope for the common law
changes discussed above is the influence of existing statutory
law on the tort theories. Both IIED and invasion of privacy
became more successful tort theories after the emergence of
Title VII harassment law. The influence of harassment law
under Title VII has made IIED a more successful theory in the
employment context.3" The ADA, with its limitations on preemployment medical testing and other limitations on the
dissemination and use of information about disabilities, should
bolster the invasion of privacy tort in the context of genetic
discrimination. Although there is not as much federal law
relevant to electronic monitoring, a recent case under the
Federal Wiretap Act indicates that the case law under federal
statutes could strengthen the privacy tort with respect to
electronic monitoring. Specifically, in Smith v. Devers,"8 a
federal district court reversed the granting of summary
judgment on claims under the Federal Wiretap Act and the tort
of invasion of privacy where an employer taped private
telephone conversations of an employee.
A third reason to hope and believe that courts will make
adjustments in the torts is the change in IIED in Texas in
recent years. Texas is one of the strongest at-will states in the
nation,"' but its courts have permitted the development of IIED
in the workplace. The Texas Supreme Court recognized IED in
a workplace resulting in resignations in GTE Southwest, Inc. v.
Bruce.' Practitioners predicted that the case would make it
more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgments on
IIED claims.381 A survey of Texas cases appears to support this
prediction, although employers still win quite a few." In one of
the most conspicuous of the post-GTE Southwest IIED cases in
377 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

2002 WL 75803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002).
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985)
(recognizing narrow public policy exception to employment at will); Montgomery
County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998) (discussing the specificity of
statement required for Texas courts to find an employment contract of definite
duration).
380 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999). For discussion of the case and consideration of
both prior Texas case law involving IIED in the workplace and the ramifications of the
GTE Southwest case on future workplace claims, see Dudley G. Jordan, Expanding the
Potentialfor Recovery of Mental Anguish Damages in the Employment Setting: A Case
Note on GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 461 (2000).
381 Earl M. Jones, III, et al., Employment and Labor Law, 54 SMU L. REV.
378

379Cf

1307, 1332 (2001).
32 Id. at 1332-36.
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the Texas courts, an appellate court affirmed an award of
approximately ten million dollars, including eight million
dollars in exemplary damages, to a former employee who sued
for sexual harassment and IIED. 3
Even more recently, a Connecticut case indicates that
some courts are becoming more receptive to IIED claims in the
workplace setting. In Benton v. Simpson," five plaintiffs sued
their manager for IIED based on his temper tantrums,
profanity-laced tirades, and physical acts such as pounding on
file cabinets. The plaintiffs testified that the defendant made
statements such as, "You women make me sick, you're like a
3
85
cancer."
The plaintiffs requested a prejudgment remedy to
secure a monetary award in the case. The trial court conducted
a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to
believe that the plaintiffs would prevail. Remarkably, the trial
court determined that there was probable cause and ordered an
attachment on the equity in the defendant's house in the
amount of one hundred thousand dollars. Affirming, the
appellate court commented on the outrage element of the tort:
"[B]ecause the plaintiffs and defendant worked in close
proximity to one another and because of the nature of the
employment relationship, it was difficult for the plaintiffs to
avoid continued interaction with the defendant."'
Thus, common law tort theories can be modified to
effectively
address
electronic
monitoring,
genetic
discrimination, and general harassment. Critics of a common
law approach are understandably skeptical that courts will
make the needed adjustments. However, as described above,
there is reason to believe that the torts will evolve to reflect
society's values in addressing these problems. Although the
pace of common law change is slower, the benefits should be
worth the wait.

38
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 69 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2002).
The Hoffman-La Roche case involved sexual harassment, however, and the willingness
of courts to permit recovery does not always translate to status-neutral harassment.
For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that sexual harassment might
be considered outrageous in Bustameto v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992), but it
reversed a judgment for a man who was the victim of a pattern of harassment in
Nicholas v.All-State Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).
384829 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
3

Id. at 71.

"'Id. at 74.
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The Relationship Between Workers' Compensation Law
and a Tort Approach

Some point to state workers' compensation laws as a
potential problem for tort law solutions in the employment
context. The concern is that exclusivity provisions in many
states' laws render employers immune from tort lawsuits.387
However, this should not be a significant impediment to a tortbased approach. Either tort law or workers' compensation law
is available to provide a remedy, and under some workers'
compensation laws, both will be available. Most notably, under
many state compensation laws, the exclusivity provision does
not apply to intentional torts," allowing a plaintiff suing for
IIED389 or invasion of privacy" to recover in tort.
If a plaintiff is in a jurisdiction that does not have an
exception for intentional torts or the plaintiff is unable to prove
an intentional tort, the plaintiffs tort claim may still survive.
Many states have heightened requirements for workers'
compensation coverage of mental injuries caused by mental
stress. 9' While this seemingly inures to the benefit of the
employer, it can have an ironic effect. If the injured employee
cannot satisfy the heightened requirements for workers'
compensation coverage, then the exclusivity provision may not
apply (i.e., no coverage, no exclusivity), and the employee may
be able to sue for negligence. 92
A second role for workers' compensation law would be as
a factor for courts to use in evaluating conduct to determine
whether it is sufficiently outrageous under an IIED claim or
highly offensive under an invasion of privacy claim. If courts
find that no workers' compensation remedy is available, that
should be a basis for lowering the bar for tort recovery. This is
justified in view of the history of workers' compensation laws in
relation to tort law. Workers' compensation laws were adopted
to provide a remedy for workplace injuries when tort defenses

387 See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 56-57 (discussing this problem with

a torts approach to workplace injuries).
388 1 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 102.13 (Clark Boardman
Callaghan
1993).
3 PERRITT, supra note 115, at § 8.13.
390 See, e.g., Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763 (N.H. 2002).
391 1 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION, supra note 388, § 109.29.
39 Richardson v. Home Depot U.S.A., 808 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 2001);
Grimm v. US West Communications, Inc., 644 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2002).
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barred recovery. The interaction between tort law and workers'
compensation always has been to provide a remedy for workers
injured in the workplace.
The role of the workers' compensation laws when they
were first enacted in the early 1900s was to provide benefits in
cases in which tort recoveries were virtually impossible. 3
Then, lawmakers were concerned with rampant physical
injuries resulting during the rise of industrialism. Now, as
mental distress becomes a growing concern because of bullying,
electronic monitoring, and genetic testing, a balance can be
struck between the workers' compensation law and tort law to
provide coverage for injuries." Accordingly, one can see
workers' compensation laws not as a problem or obstacle in tort
responses to employment law issues, but as part of a solution
that adjusts existing and malleable tort theories to address
emerging workplace issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are a number of problems with legislative
solutions to emerging workplace problems, particularly
invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination, and bullying. The
epoch of reliance on statutory responses to employment
problems has had two unfortunate consequences. First, the
common law, which has been such an important part of the law
regulating people's daily lives, has lost ground in one of the
major relationships of modern life: work. Second, and relatedly,
when there is no employment statute to act as a check, the
dominance of employment at will and the related notions of
employer power and prerogative skew common law doctrine
and analysis.
Modern common law solutions can correct these
distortions. True, common law will not eliminate harmful
conduct in the workplace as fast as federal statutes, but federal
statutes creating meaningful and worthwhile protections of
employees' dignity are not going to be enacted. Moreover, it is

93 See, e.g., ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: DESK

EDITION §§ 4.30 & 5.20 (1982).
For example, a Louisiana state court, noting that there was no workers'
compensation coverage for an employee's mental distress injuries, permitted the
negligent infliction claim to go forward, noting that an employer's duty to provide a
safe work place includes a duty to avoid causing a "mental breakdown." Richardson,
808 So. 2d at 550 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
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not clear that they should be. There are problems of fit, timing,
and overuse of legislation. One of the positive characteristics of
the common law is that it can and does adjust to reflect
society's values.395 That tort law would not impose liability in as
many cases as some employee rights advocates wish is not
necessarily bad.9 The Supreme Court has been adamant that
not even Title VII is a general civility code that will address
every unpleasantry. 7
Writing about IIED in the context of wrongful
discharges, Professor Mark Gergen recognized its rare
successes and defended its use for egregious cases."9 Gergen
remarked on an important aspect of the role for the common
law in employment cases. In areas in which the conduct is
difficult to define and there are important competing interests
such that the society is not willing to pass meaningful
legislation, tort law and contract law should fill the breach. The
common law patrols the ambiguous border of acceptability,
catching the cases that clearly cross over. What is needed now
to improve American workplaces is for the common law to catch
more cases of harassment, electronic monitoring, and genetic
discrimination. That can and should be done without new
legislation.
Federal legislation was needed to deal with
discriminators in the last century. It is not yet clear that
controlling electronic and genetic privacy invaders and bullies
requires more legislation. With common law filling some gaps,
over time society will discover whether legislation is needed
and appropriate. Until then, however, what we need is a
revitalized common law of the workplace.

395 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship
Can Teach Us About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1995)
("Tort jurisprudence is a relatively accurate reflector of American society's basic
principles for microgovernance.").
39 See Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 31 n.127 (observing that Professor
Austin "casts her net too broadly" in trying to pull within the ambit of IIED workplace
conduct that is merely unpleasant); Kim, supra note 17, at 691 (arguing that not every
violation of privacy should have a legal remedy because "[s]ome intrusions are so trivial
that they will be experienced by most people as mere annoyances or rudeness.").
3'Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
3'8 Gergen, supra note 28, at 1737-39.

